Insurance Coverage Mandates for Preventive Care: The Market for Contraceptives by Becker, Nora Verlaine
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations
1-1-2015
Insurance Coverage Mandates for Preventive Care:
The Market for Contraceptives
Nora Verlaine Becker
University of Pennsylvania, norabecker47@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations
Part of the Economics Commons, and the Health and Medical Administration Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1606
For more information, please contact libraryrepository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Becker, Nora Verlaine, "Insurance Coverage Mandates for Preventive Care: The Market for Contraceptives" (2015). Publicly Accessible
Penn Dissertations. 1606.
http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1606
Insurance Coverage Mandates for Preventive Care: The Market for
Contraceptives
Abstract
Laws that mandate contraceptive coverage by private health insurance plans are common at the state level, and
the Affordable Care Act (ACA) also recently mandated coverage at the national level. Little empirical work
has examined the potential impact of these laws on women’s contraceptive utilization. I perform both 1) a
short-term analysis of the impact of the ACA's mandate using available data, and 2) an examination of 29
state-level contraception coverage mandates passed between 1999 and 2010 that could shed light upon the
long-term utilization impacts of the national mandate. For these analyses, I use two datasets: the first a
50-state survey with an extensive set of individual-level covariates, and the second a proprietary claims dataset
with detailed information on contraceptive utilization and out-of-pocket spending. I find suggestive evidence
that the state mandates resulted in increased insurance coverage of some methods of contraceptives, but find
no resulting changes in overall utilization or the type of method chosen. I find that the ACA mandate has
caused large decreases in out-of-pocket spending on contraceptives, but I detect only very small changes in
utilization in response, implying that demand for contraceptives among privately insured women is fairly
price-insensitive. My results suggest that mandating insurance coverage of contraceptives is unlikely to result
in immediate or large changes in patterns of contraceptive use in the U.S.
Degree Type
Dissertation
Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Graduate Group
Health Care Management & Economics
First Advisor
Daniel Polsky
Second Advisor
Mark Pauly
Keywords
Affordable Care Act, Contraceptives, Health Economics, Health Policy, Preventive Care, Women's Health
Subject Categories
Economics | Health and Medical Administration
This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1606
INSURANCE COVERAGE MANDATES FOR PREVENTIVE CARE: THE
MARKET FOR CONTRACEPTIVES
Nora Verlaine Becker
A DISSERTATION
in
Health Care Management and Economics
For the Graduate Group in Managerial Science and Applied Economics
Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania
in
Partial Fulﬁllment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
2015
Supervisor of Dissertation
Daniel Polsky, Professor of Medicine and Health Care Management
Graduate Group Chairperson
Eric Bradlow, Professor of Marketing
Dissertation Committee
Daniel Polsky, Professor of Medicine and Health Care Management
Mark Pauly, Professor of Health Care Management
Scott Harrington, Professor of Health Care Management
Guy David, Associate Professor of Health Care Management
Kevin Volpp, Professor of Medicine and Health Care Management
INSURANCE COVERAGE MANDATES FOR PREVENTIVE CARE: THE
MARKET FOR CONTRACEPTIVES
© COPYRIGHT
2015
Nora Verlaine Becker
Dedicated to my mother.
When I was ten, I had to write a report for my 5th grade teacher on a topic of my
choosing. I asked her for advice and she said, "How about birth control?" So really,
this is all her fault.
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ABSTRACT
INSURANCE COVERAGE MANDATES FOR PREVENTIVE CARE: THE
MARKET FOR CONTRACEPTIVES
Nora Verlaine Becker
Daniel Polsky
Laws that mandate contraceptive coverage by private health insurance plans are com-
mon at the state level, and the Aﬀordable Care Act (ACA) also recently mandated
coverage at the national level. Little empirical work has examined the potential
impact of these laws on women's contraceptive utilization. I perform both 1) a short-
term analysis of the impact of the ACA's mandate using available data, and 2) an
examination of 29 state-level contraception coverage mandates passed between 1999
and 2010 that could shed light upon the long-term utilization impacts of the national
mandate. For these analyses, I use two datasets: the ﬁrst a 50-state survey with an ex-
tensive set of individual-level covariates, and the second a proprietary claims dataset
with detailed information on contraceptive utilization and out-of-pocket spending.
I ﬁnd suggestive evidence that the state mandates resulted in increased insurance
coverage of some methods of contraceptives, but ﬁnd no resulting changes in overall
utilization or the type of method chosen. I ﬁnd that the ACA mandate has caused
large decreases in out-of-pocket spending on contraceptives, but I detect only very
small changes in utilization in response, implying that demand for contraceptives
among privately insured women is fairly price-insensitive. My results suggest that
mandating insurance coverage of contraceptives is unlikely to result in immediate or
large changes in patterns of contraceptive use in the U.S.
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CHAPTER 1 : Introduction
As part of the health care reform law that I signed last year, all insurance
plans are required to cover preventive care at no cost. That means free check-
ups, free mammograms, immunizations and other basic services. We fought for
this because it saves lives and it saves money  for families, for businesses, for
government, for everybody.
 President Barack Obama, February 12th, 2012
In policy discussions, prevention is often cited as a panacea for the problems in
the U.S. health care system; better health for less money. With this rationale, the
Aﬀordable Care Act (ACA) included a mandate that private health insurance cover
all preventive services with no consumer cost-sharing. Empirical research, however,
suggests that this claim is overly optimistic. Preventive care is not all the same, and
the cost and health impacts of of this mandate are likely to vary widely by service.
One particular type of preventive service included in the ACA's mandate, prescription
contraception, has drawn political and legal attention. But little empirical analysis
has been directed at the potential impacts of mandating contraceptive coverage on
consumer demand for contraceptives and and product choice.
Contraceptives are among the most widely used medical services in the U.S.; 99% of
sexually active women have used at least one type of contraceptive in their lifetime
(Jones et al., 2013). Furthermore, use of prescription contraceptives has been shown
to result in net savings in medical costs (Trussell et al., 2009; Foster et al., 2009). As
a consumer product, it has important eﬀects on families and the economy; its use has
been found to increase labor force participation, wages and family incomes (Bailey
et al., 2012; Bailey, 2013; Goldin and Katz, 2002; Ananat and Hungerman, 2007).
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Economic theory and empirical evidence suggest that decreasing the out-of-pocket
(OOP) costs of contraception to consumers will result in increased utilization (Pauly,
1968; Manning et al., 1987). Furthermore, diﬀerences in relative price changes may
induce a change in the distribution of methods chosen. However, mandating private
health coverage of contraceptives is not guaranteed to increase contraceptive use or re-
duce costs. The impact of an insurance mandate varies by two important factors: the
elasticity of demand and the pre-existing levels of insurance coverage for the product.
If demand for a product is inelastic enough, it's possible that an insurance mandate for
a very cost-eﬀective service may still ultimately increase insurer spending, potentially
raising the cost of insurance (Pauly and Held, 1990). Very few studies have estimated
the price responsiveness of consumers to the out-of-pocket price of contraceptives in
the U.S., and therefore the impact of mandating coverage of contraceptives cannot
be predicted from prior research alone.
This study will examine state and national laws that mandate inclusion of contra-
ception coverage in private health insurance plans. Speciﬁcally, I will examine two
types of contraceptive coverage mandates: twenty-nine state-level mandates passed
between 1998 and 2011, and the ACA's national mandate. These results contribute
valuable empirical evidence to the larger question of the eﬀects of mandating insur-
ance coverage of preventive services on utilization.
1.1. The market for contraceptives in the U.S.
Contraceptive methods vary widely in their product characteristics. Some are covered
by insurance and require a physician visit and prescription, while others are available
over-the-counter. The mechanism of action varies, as does the frequency with which
a method must be used to be eﬀective. Methods also vary in their out-of-pocket
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price. Figure 1 brieﬂy describes each method by its method of administration and
eﬀectiveness. Contraceptive methods tend to become more expensive, and require
less frequent use, as they become more eﬀective.
Methods can be grouped into diﬀerent categories. The ﬁrst are non-prescription
methods; these include condoms, spermicide, the sponge and calendar-based meth-
ods. Because these methods are free or available over-the-counter (OTC), they are
unaﬀected by laws that change insurance coverage of contraceptives. Among prescrip-
tion contraceptives, there are two infrequently used methodsthe diaphragm and the
cervical capthat must be used at the time of intercourse to be eﬀective. Both of
these methods require a one-time ﬁtting by a gynecologist and are therefore classiﬁed
as prescription-only. The next category are the shorter-term methods that must be
used daily or weekly such as oral contraceptive pills (OCPs), the vaginal ring, and
the cutaneous patch. These methods require a prescription, are subject to a co-pay,
and consumers typically purchase one, two or three months supply at a time. Finally,
there are two types of methodsintrauterine devices (IUDs) and subdermal implants
that are known together as long-acting reversible contraceptives (LARC) because they
provide very eﬀective pregnancy prevention for years. There are currently three IUD
products on the market: two hormonal IUDs that last for three and ﬁve years, and
a copper IUD that lasts 10 years. There is one implant on the market that lasts 3
years. All of these products require an in-oﬃce procedure to be inserted and removed;
depending on the insurance plan, both the device itself and the procedure may be
subject to a deductible or coinsurance.
The ﬁnal contraceptive products are emergency contraception (EC) and surgical ster-
ilization. Emergency contraception is a one or two pill formulation of hormones
designed to prevent pregnancy immediately following intercourse. Emergency contra-
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ception was initially prescription-only, and after a lengthy and controversial regulatory
process, one brand (Plan B) was made available over-the-counter (OTC) in August
2006 for individuals aged 18 and older. These age and brand restrictions have been
relaxed piecemeal through subsequent regulatory changes. Currently, several one-pill
generic brands are available OTC without age restriction, while two-pill generics are
available behind the counter, i.e., without a prescription but not on the shelf, for
consumers aged 17 and older. There is one EC brand, ella, that uses a diﬀerent com-
pound than all other products on the market, that is still available prescription-only
(Trussell et al., 2014). Finally, sterilization, either male or female, is a surgical and
permanent method of contraception. Female sterilization (tubal ligation) is covered
by the mandates that I study, but male sterilization (vasectomy) is not.
A mention must also be made of medical abortifacients, that is, medications designed
to induce abortion. These are not prescription contraceptives and are not included
in any of the mandates that I examine.
A recent study of women aged 15 to 44 found that 62.2% were using some method
of contraception, and 48.1% were using a prescription contraceptive method. Ster-
ilization (male or female) was the most common choice (22.7%), followed by oral
contraceptive pills (17.1%), and the IUD (3.5%), with all other prescription methods
combining to make up 4.5% of women (Jones et al., 2012).
1.2. Prior literature
This project contributes to three major areas of the literature: insurance coverage
mandates, the impacts of cost-sharing on demand for medical services, and the de-
mand for preventive care in general and contraception in particular.
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1.2.1. Insurance coverage mandates
Insurance coverage mandates are a frequently used policy tool. As a government
intervention, they are more eﬃcient but less equitable than direct public provision of
a service (Summers, 1989). Empirical research has shown that the costs of insurance
coverage mandates are imperfectly passed to consumers in the form of lower wages
(Gruber and Krueger, 1990; Gruber, 1994a). However, state-level mandates in par-
ticular may not always bind if most insurance plans already oﬀer coverage for the
mandated service (Gruber, 1994b).
State-level insurance coverage mandates for preventive services in particular have been
growing in popularity. A 2006 study found that 20% of the 1,471 active state-level
coverage mandates were speciﬁcally for preventive services (Laugesen et al., 2006).
Studies of these mandates have found mixed results. Mandates for mammography
coverage have been found to signiﬁcantly increase mammography rates (Bitler and
Carpenter, 2011), and mandates for coverage of cervical cancer screening have been
found to increase rates of pap smear testing (Bitler and Carpenter, 2012). But man-
dates for mental health treatment have been found to have no eﬀect on suicide rates
(Klick and Markowitz, 2006), and mandates for coverage of diabetes preventive care
found impacts on use of some but not all diabetes prevention tools (Li et al., 2010).
A study examining the impact of the dependent coverage provision of the ACA found
that young adults newly eligible for coverage under their parents' plans recieved more
regular dental and health check-ups and increased blood pressure management, but
saw no signiﬁcant change in rates of inﬂuenza vaccination or pap smear testing (Han
et al., 2014). All of the above studies used a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimation strat-
egy to isolate causal impacts of the policy they studied.
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Results from these studies are not generalizable to contraception coverage mandates,
because their results depend on pre-existing coverage levels and demand elasticity
for the service. In addition, contraception is unique among preventive services for a
few reasons. First, there is more variety of product characteristics and OOP costs
than is typically seen for preventive services, with options ranging from short-term
solutions that cost a few dollars to permanent surgeries that can cost thousands
of dollars. Second, the population that consumes contraception is young women
of reproductive age, a group that on average consumes few other health services.
Finally, contraceptive use carries normative implications that other preventive services
lack, and remains a ﬂashpoint in the cultural discussion of the sexual revolution.
For all these reasons, it is important to study contraceptive coverage mandates and
empirically estimate their direct eﬀect on consumers.
Rationale for an insurance coverage mandate for contraceptives
There are several potential rationales for or against an insurance coverage mandate
for contraceptives, either at the state or federal level. In his classic paper examin-
ing the economics of mandated beneﬁts, Summers (1989) gives three reasons why it
may be appropriate to mandate employee beneﬁts: paternalism, positive externali-
ties, and mitigating adverse selection. All three are worth discussing in the case of
contraceptives.
1. Paternalism: If there is reason to believe that consumers are not making rational
choices with regards to the costs and beneﬁts of a service, it may be welfare-
increasing to change the cost to aﬀect their behavior. There is evidence that
this may be the case for contraceptive use in the U.S. Studies have shown that
women who under-rate their risk of pregnancy are less likely to use emergency
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contraception following unprotected sex (Moreau et al., 2005; Sørensen et al.,
2000). It's also likely that some women, especially young women or adolescents,
may not be able to accurately esimate the social and ﬁnancial costs of bearing a
child. A recent working paper by Kearney and Levine (2014) ﬁnds that media
exposure to the realities of teen childbearing results in drops in teen birth rates,
suggesting that many teens may lack the ability to fully imagine the realities
of parenthood on their own. Lastly, current estimates suggest that about half
of pregnancies in the U.S. are unplanned, and of those, 43% end in abortion
(Finer and Zolna, 2011). One rationale for a contraceptive coverage mandate
is therefore that it may increase use of contraceptives among women who are
unable to accurately assess the cost and probability of pregnancy.
2. Positive externalities: The presence of positive externalities from use of a service
is another rationale to mandate insurance coverage. When a service produces
a positive externality, it means that beneﬁts accrue to individuals who do not
bear the cost of the service. There is some evidence this may be the case for
contraceptive use; results of studies of the legalization of the pill in the 1960s
and 1970s suggest that contraceptive use may produce economic beneﬁts not
just to contraceptive users but to their families and children as well. See Section
1.2.3 for a detailed discussion of this body of literature.
Selection: Unlike the ﬁrst two examples, the possibility of selection on contraceptive
coverage does not provide a rationale for mandating insurance coverage of con-
traception. In the case of health insurance, if some employers oﬀer the beneﬁt
and others do not, sicker employees may be more likely to choose employers who
oﬀer the beneﬁt. However, it is not at all obvious that selection on coverage
of contraception alone occurs among employees. And even if it did, it could
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potentially be an example of positive selection rather than adverse selection;
women who use contraception are less likely to have children, and therefore less
likely to take time oﬀ and use other costly medical services. I have not seen
an in-depth discussion of this idea anywhere in the literature, but regardless,
mitigating adverse selection does not seem to be a good rationale for a con-
traceptive coverage mandate. Furthermore, if selection exists at the employer
level, it makes it less likely that an insurance coverage mandate will have an
eﬀect on rates of contraceptive use.
1.2.2. The impact of cost-sharing on demand for medical services
The classic RAND health insurance experiment demonstrated that patients are price
sensitive to the out-of-pocket cost of medical services (Manning et al., 1987), and
the results seen in that study have been corroborated by more recent work (Gruber,
2006). Subsequent work focusing on demand for prescription drugs ﬁnds similarly
that higher cost-sharing generally leads to less consumption, although not always a
switch to generic drug options (Gibson et al., 2005; Eaddy et al., 2012; Gaynor et al.,
2006).
The largest recent expansion of prescription drug coverage, the Medicare Part D
program, has been studied extensively by researchers. Ketcham and Simon (2008) ﬁnd
Medicare Part D decreased OOP costs and modestly increased utilization, implying
an elasticity of -0.22, while Duggan and Morton (2010) also ﬁnd that utilization
increased, although the price-responsiveness varied by drug and by the status of prior
prescription drug coverage. Decreased OOP costs have also been shown to reduce
cost-related medication nonadherence (Madden et al., 2008). These studies, however,
exclusively examine an elderly population with many more chronic health conditions
than the population of younger women in private health insurance. I've found far
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fewer studies examining the impact of decreases in OOP cost on prescription drug
utilization among this population.
A newer strand of the health economics literature has begun to study the impact
of varying cost-sharing at the patient level by medical service. This is known as
value-based insurance design, or VBID. Traditional health insurance includes one
level of cost-sharing that applies to all consumers. However, traditional insurance is
predicated upon the economic assumption that, when facing cost-sharing, patients
will only consume medical care for which the marginal beneﬁts equal or exceed the
marginal costs. This assumes the consumer has perfect knowledge of the costs and
beneﬁts of all potential medical care. If this assumption is relaxed, it becomes optimal
to vary cost-sharing levels to induce patients to use the services that will provide the
most marginal beneﬁt to them. In practice, this typically takes two forms: 1) reducing
co-payments for all patients for clinical services deemed to be high-value, or 2)
implementing a more individualized approach where individual copayments are based
on patient characteristics (Chernew et al., 2007). An insurance coverage mandate for
contraceptive care could be considered an example of the ﬁrst type of VBID. There
is no question that contraception can be considered a high-value medical service
from a budgetary perspective; it's use has been shown to produce cost savings of $1.3
to $7 per dollar spent, depending on the method (Foster et al., 2009). These are
cost-savings on the same order as that of childhood vaccinations.
VBID programs are increasingly popular; a 2010 study found that while only 20%
of large employers had a VBID program, 81% were interested or very interested in
implementing one during the next ﬁve years (Choudhry et al., 2010b). Because these
programs are relatively new, studies assessing their impact on health care use are
a small but growing ﬁeld of the health policy literature. In general, early studies
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of VBID programs have been mixed. Some have found that decreasing co-pays for
high-value drugs or services have resulted in increases in use of the targeted service,
however, most studies have found only small or moderate eﬀect sizes (Chernew et al.,
2008; Choudhry et al., 2010a; Cranor et al., 2003).
1.2.3. Demand for preventive care and contraception
Theory of demand for preventive care
Demand for prevention was ﬁrst modeled by Ehrlich and Becker (1972). They ﬁnd
that insurance lowers the amount of preventive care demanded as long as the price
of insurance does not contract on the amount of preventive care consumed. This
ineﬃciency is referred to as ex ante moral hazard in subsequent literature. They also
ﬁnd that risk aversion is neither necessary nor suﬃcient to determine an optimal value
of preventive care that an individual will demand. This is somewhat counter-intuitive,
but it has been shown in subsequent literature as well. An individual's demand for
preventive care is dependent on the functional form of their utility and cannot be
assumed to be increasing in risk aversion (Dionne and Eeckhoudt, 1985; Eeckhoudt
and Gollier, 2005; Jullien et al., 1999).
Ellis and Manning (2007) solve for the socially optimal cost-sharing levels for preven-
tion and treatment. They ﬁnd that some coverage of preventive care is optimal as
long as the premium price does not reﬂect the amount of prevention consumed. This
is because the consumer does not take the impact of their use of preventive care on
premium price into account when calculating their demand for preventive care, and
therefore underconsumes prevention relative to the social optimum.
At the market level, Pauly and Held (1990) show that providing insurance of a pre-
ventive service that is cost-eﬀective (in the sense that its use results in lower total
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expected medical spending) can still result in a net increase in insurer medical ex-
penses. They show that covering preventive services for which demand is elastic will
be more likely to reduce insurer spending, because providing coverage will induce a
greater increase in utilization, oﬀsetting the costs of paying for the costs of prevention.
However, if demand for a preventive service is inelastic enough, providing coverage
will only increase utilization by a small amount and total costs to the insurer will rise
because they achieve fewer cost savings but are still paying for the preventive service
for people who were already consuming it before coverage was provided. Frakt (2014)
calls this eﬀect crowding out of private consumption of the preventive service.
Studies of demand for contraceptives
Most estimates of the demand elasticity for contraception are from studies in the de-
veloping world. These studies have typically found demand for contraceptives to be
relatively inelastic, depending on the method studied (Lewis, 1986). Of the studies
that have estimated price eﬀects of overall use of contraceptives, estimates range from
0 to -0.15 (Matheny, 2004). However, many of these studies take a cross-sectional ap-
proach and rely on self-reported price estimates by relatively uninformed consumers.
Further, they often ignore the possibility of substitution to other brands or methods,
or to lower-cost providers, in response to price changes (Janowitz and Bratt, 1996).
Studies of responses to price changes in the U.S. are uncommon. Recently, an in-
progress working paper examined the price impacts of the Deﬁcit Reduction Act of
2005, which inadvertantly increased the price of oral contraceptive pills at college
health centers more than three-fold. They ﬁnd that this price change reduced OCP
use among college women by 1.5 percentage points (3-4%). The decline was two to
three times as large for college women with large amounts of credit card debt or
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without health insurance. They use a back-of-the-envelope calculation to estimate
the demand elasticity of college women for OCPs between -0.09 and -0.04, a very
inelastic estimate (Collins and Hershbein, 2013).
In a recent prospective cohort study, the Contraceptive CHOICE Project, 9000 women
in a metropolitan area were educated about reversible contraception and oﬀered their
choice of method at no cost; methods were presented in the order of most to least
eﬀective. The women were followed for two to three years. Among study participants,
75% chose a LARC method, and the subsequent rates of unintended pregnancy, births
and abortions among these women were signiﬁcantly lower than those seen nationally
(Secura et al., 2014; McNicholas et al., 2014). Although these ﬁndings are suggestive,
it is hard to disentangle the eﬀects of the zero OOP price from the accompanying
changes in provider behavior and contraceptive counseling to isolate a pure price eﬀect
on demand.
There is also a body of literature that studies the impact of changes in legal access
to contraception. These could be seen as changes in the non-monetary cost of con-
suming contraception. These studies typically use geographic variation in the timing
of laws or policy changes to generate causal estimates of the impact of these policies
on outcomes of interest. For instance, several papers have studied the impact of ge-
ographic variation in the legalization of the contraceptive pill on subsequent fertility
rates, family sizes, women's wages, and outcomes for the ﬁrst generation of children
born to women with access to the birth control pill. These studies ﬁnd that increased
legal access to the pill for married women in the 1960s explains 40% of the drop in
the U.S. marital fertility rate between 1955 and 1965 and 30% of the convergence of
the gender gap in wages in the 1990s (Bailey, 2010; Bailey et al., 2012). Furthermore,
economic gains from access to contraception are perpetuated in further generations;
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decades after individuals' access to contraception increases, their children have higher
college completion, labor force participation, wages and family income (Bailey, 2013).
Similarly, other studies have used variation in the legal diﬀusion of the birth control
pill among unmarried women and found that access to birth control decreases fertility
and subsequent entry into poverty, and increases age at ﬁrst marriage and subsequent
entry into professional school (Goldin and Katz, 2002; Ananat and Hungerman, 2007;
Browne and LaLumia, 2014).
All of these studies exploit the variation in legal access to the pill for married and
unmarried women in the 1960s and 1970s. In contrast, very few studies have exam-
ined the margin of increased coverage of contraception in health insurance. A study
by Kearney and Levine (2009) leveraged variation in expansion of Medicaid cover-
age of family planning services in the mid-1990s to examine the eﬀect of access to
contraception on fertility rates of women on Medicaid. They ﬁnd that income-based
subsidies of contraception lowered the fertility rate of teens by 4% and of non-teens
by 2% (Kearney and Levine, 2009).
To the best of my knowledge, only three other studies have looked at the state-level
contraception mandates that I plan to examine. The ﬁrst, by Magnusson et. al.
(2012), uses data from the 2006-2008 wave of the National Survey of Family Growth.
They examine cross-sectional variation in birth control utilization in states with and
without mandates, and ﬁnd that privately-insured women are more likely to use birth
control consistently in states with contraception coverage mandates (Magnusson et al.,
2012). These ﬁndings, while suggestive, do not allow for causal inference because they
cannot show that states with mandates did also not have higher contraceptive use
prior to the mandates.
The second and third studies examine the state-level mandates using a cross-sectional
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diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach. Both studies use data from the Behavioral Risk
Factor Surveillance Survey (BRFSS) to examine a subset of states for which data
on contraceptive use is available. However, both of these analyses are done using
survey data, and are unable to exclude women in insurance plans not subject to state
insurance regulations.
Atkins and Bradford (2014) use women in two states (Delaware and Iowa) that im-
plemented mandates as their treatment group and three states without mandates
(Kentucky, Nebraska and South Dakota) as their control group. Their regression
speciﬁcation includes year and state ﬁxed eﬀects. They ﬁnd that women living in
states following mandate implementation are 5% more likely to report use of OCPs
relative to women living in states without mandates. They ﬁnd no change in use of
other prescription contraceptive methods (Atkins and Bradford, 2014).
The ﬁnal study, an in-progress working paper, also uses data from the 1998 through
2011 BRFSS waves to examine contraceptive utilization, this time using all states for
which BRFSS data is available. The states that included questions about family plan-
ning in the BRFSS survey varied from year to year, so although their data contains
women in all 50 states, there are only nine mandates for which they have at least one
year of pre- and post-mandate data (DE HI, IO, IL, MA, ME, NC, NH, and NM)
(Dills and Cotet-Grecu, 2014). In addition, the mandates they list in their appendix
appear to be slightly inaccurate; there is a mandate mistakenly assigned to Alabama,
and no mandate listed for Arizona, Colorado, Michigan and Montana. They ﬁnd that
contraceptive mandates are associated with a 19 percentage point rise in OCP use
among 18-19 year olds (an 86% increase), and a 5 percentage point rise in OCP use
among 20-24 year olds (16% increase). The 19pp rise in OCP use among 18-19 year
olds suggests a demand elasticity much larger than previous literature has suggested.
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They also ﬁnd a signiﬁcant increase in sexual activity among 18-19 year olds and
a signiﬁcant decrease in sterilization among 20-34 year olds. They then move from
individual-level BRFSS data to aggregate state-year-level data to examine abortion
rates, fertility rates, prenatal care rates, and rates of delivery complications. They
ﬁnd decreased fertility, increased prenatal care, and decreased delivery complications
among Hispanic women, but not other racial/ethnic groups. They ﬁnd no eﬀects on
abortion rates for any groups.
My project also ﬁts into the growing body of research that seeks to examine and
quantify the impact of the ACA. However, few studies focus solely on the contracep-
tion coverage mandate itself. One study has examined the change in OOP prices for
women following the ACA mandate among a longitudinal survey of 892 women. They
found that the percent of privately insured women paying zero for their OCPs had
increased from 15% to 67% between fall of 2012 and spring of 2014, and the average
monthly price had decreased from $14 to $6. Increases of similar magnitude were seen
among users of injectable contraception, IUDs and the vaginal ring (Sonﬁeld et al.,
2014). A report by IMS Health on prescription drug use in 2013 found that prescrip-
tions of hormonal contraceptives had increased by 4.6% between 2012 and 2013, with
the fraction of patients with zero cost-sharing rising from 20% to 50%. The report
doesn't specify exactly which types of contraceptives are included in their data, but
they estimate that the ACA mandate reduced OOP spending on contraceptives in the
U.S. by $483 million in 2013 (IMSHealth, 2014). To my knowledge, no study has yet
examined the impact of the ACA mandate on contraceptive use in a causal empirical
framework.
My proposed analysis will add to the existing literature in several important ways.
First, it will examine a newer dimension of increased access to contraception: that of
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improved coverage of contraception by health insurance. This margin of access has
been little-studied in the empirical literature. My analysis of the state-level man-
dates diﬀers from prior studies of these mandates for several reasons: I examine all
of the state-level mandates rather than a subset, I look at whether diﬀerent types of
mandates have diﬀerential impacts, and in my claims data analysis of the state man-
dates I can identify women in plans aﬀected by the mandate better than in previous
studies. Second, to my knowledge this will be the ﬁrst study to date to examine the
ACA's mandate in a causal framework. My results, while necessarily short-term, will
add empirical evidence to a hotly debated policy issue lacking in rigorous empirical
analysis. Lastly, this project will add to the larger body of literature studying the
eﬀects of insurance coverage mandates for preventive services.
1.3. Theoretical motivation
1.3.1. Expected utility framework: One period, one method
I use a model of expected utility to conceptualize contraceptive use as a preventive
service, in this case a service to reduce the probability of unwanted pregnancy. A
woman has utility purely over consumption, U(x), and utility is increasing in x.
There is only one potential birth control method with price P , which she can choose
to use or not. If she uses it, her probability of pregnancy is lowered from φ to φ−4φ,
with 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1. If she becomes pregnant, she incurs a cost of B. Her income
is M . She will choose to use the birth control method if her expected utility from
use is greater than her expected utility from no use, in other words, if the following
inequality holds:
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(1− φ+4φ)U(M − P ) + (φ−4φ)U(M − P −B) >
(1− φ)U(M) + φU(M −B)
A small decrease in P will increase the left-hand side of the equation while leaving
the right-hand side unchanged, making a woman more likely to choose to purchase
contraception. We can rearrange the above equation to read:
4φ[U(M − P )− U(M − P −B)] >
(1− φ)[U(M)− U(M − P )] + φ[U(M −B)− U(M − P −B)]
On the left are the expected utility gains from using the birth control method and
therefore lowering the risk of incurring the cost of pregnancy. On the right are the
expected utility losses from incurring the cost of the birth control method, regardless
of pregnancy outcome. The result is intuitive; a woman will choose to utilize a birth
control method if the expected gain from reducing her risk of pregnancy outweighs
the certain loss from paying for the method. The determining factors for which choice
a woman makers are her baseline probability of pregnancy (φ), the magnitude of the
change in that probability from using the birth control method (4φ), and the size of
B relative to P .
Let us assume now that among a population with N women seeking to avoid preg-
nancy, each individual woman has an individual cost of unwanted pregnancy, Bi. Bi
is distributed according to some probability distribution, f(B). There are impor-
tant reasons why Bi is likely to vary across women. Direct medical costs related
to pregnancy will vary by type and generosity of insurance coverage. Bi also could
incorporate income losses from time spent on unpaid parental leave or the cost of
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childcare.
For now, let's assume that the marginal utility of consumption is constant, i.e., utility
is linear in consumption according to the formula U(x) = ax + b. It's then easy to
show that the user will choose to purchase birth control if Bi >
P
4φ . The share of
women who chose to use birth control in the population is equal to:
Prob(Bi >
P
4φ) = 1− F (
P
4φ)
Total population demand, D, is therefore equal to D = N × [1 − F ( P4φ)]. As Bi
increases, it is more likely to cross this threshold value of P4φ , so demand for contra-
ception is increasing in Bi (
dD
dBi
> 0). If P decreases, as it would if the out-of-pocket
price of contraceptives falls, the threshold any given Bi must exceed is lowered, so
dD
dP
> 0 as well.
However, if we assume that women are risk averse and that their utility over con-
sumption is concave, dD
dP
is still positive but we can no longer sign dD
dBi
. This can be
seen by rearranging the original decision rule to put all costs that include Bi on one
side of the equation as shown below. A woman chooses to use contraception if:
4φ[U(M − P )− U(M − P −Bi)]− φ[U(M −Bi)− U(M −Bi − P )] >
(1− φ)[U(M)− U(M − P )]
Looking at this equation, U(M − P )− U(M − P −Bi) is increasing as Bi increases,
but U(M − Bi) − U(M − Bi − P ) is also increasing as Bi increases. We therefore
cannot say whether demand for contraception among risk-averse women is increasing
or decreasing in Bi without making more assumptions about the functional form of
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utility.
Although this result seems counter-intuitive, it is consistent with the rest of the
theoretical literature examining demand for preventive services that I discussed in
the prior section. In general, the theoretical literature on prevention has found that
demand for prevention cannot be assumed to be increasing in risk aversion, and that
assuming concavity of utility with respect to consumption is neither necessary nor
suﬃcient for demonstrating an optimal level of preventive services that a consumer
will demand (Ehrlich and Becker, 1972; Dionne and Eeckhoudt, 1985; Jullien et al.,
1999).
In summary, economic theory unambiguously predicts that a drop in the out-of-pocket
price for contraception will cause the amount of contraception demanded to increase.
However, theoretical predictions of whether demand for prevention increases in the
cost of the unwanted outcome are ambiguous. If we assume that women are risk
neutral, demand for prevention is increasing in the cost of an unwanted pregnancy.
But if we assume that consumers are risk averse, we cannot make such a prediction
and must instead examine this question empirically.
1.3.2. Expected utility framework: Two periods, two methods, and non-monetary costs
I now consider this model in a world where there are two available birth control
methods and two periods. A woman has a risk of pregnancy φ in each period, and
discount rate β, where 0 < β < 1. If she gets pregnant, she incurs cost Bi. In period
one, she chooses either no method, Method 1 with price P1, or Method 2 with price
P2. Method 1 is analogous to an oral contraceptive; it lowers the risk of pregnancy
from φ to φ−4φ, but must be purchased in each period. Method 2 is analogous to
an IUD or sterilization; it lowers the risk of pregnancy to zero, and only needs to be
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purchased once. However, if a woman chooses Method 2, she also incurs a one-time
non-monetary cost of Ci. This could be considered a cost in time and discomfort from
receiving the IUD or a surgical procedure. If there are network eﬀects on contraceptive
choice, Ci could also represent emotional discomfort from choosing a method that is
less commonly used and with which the woman is less familiar. Ci may be lower for
better educated women or women who know other women who have successfully used
the IUD.
A woman will choose the method that maximizes the sum of expected utility in both
periods:
No method : (1− φ)U(M) + φU(M −Bi)
+β(1− φ)U(M) + βφU(M −Bi)
Method 1 : (1− φ+4φ)U(M − P1) + (φ−4φ)U(M − P1 −Bi)
+β(1− φ+4φ)U(M − P1) + β(φ−4φ)U(M − P1 −Bi)
Method 2 : U(M − P2)− Ci + βU(M)
If we again assume that utility is linear in consumption in the form U(x) = ax +
b, these expressions simpify and the woman will choose whichever is largest (less
negative) of the following three expressions:
No method : −φBi(1 + β)
Method 1 : −φBi(1 + β) + [4φBi − P1](1 + β)
Method 2 : −P2 − 1aCi
Comparing the ﬁrst and second lines, we can see that the same choice between no
method and Method 1 is embedded in this decision: if Method 2 is not an option,
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the woman will choose Method 1 if B > P4φ . However, both options must now also
be compared with P2, Ci and the utility gain that a woman gets from having an
expected cost of pregnancy equal to zero. For the expression for expected utility from
Method 2, note that a, the multplier on income in the utility function, scales the
relative weight that a woman will place on the income loss from Method 2 and the
non-monetary utility cost Ci. As a increases, −P2 − 1aCi → −P2.
We can again consider what might induce a woman to change her choice of method.
As with the simpler model above, an increase in Bi or a drop in P1 make it less likely
a woman will choose no method. With the addition of a second period in the model,
the discount factor also matters. As β → 1, that is, as the woman values future
costs closer to present costs, the options of no method and Method 1 become more
negative relative to Method 2, suggesting that forward-thinking women will be more
likely to choose Method 2. Obviously, a drop in P2 or Ci will make Method 2 more
attractive. The impact of a drop in both prices simultaneously is more diﬃcult to
predict because it depends on the relative magnitudes of all the other parameters in
the model.
1.3.3. Theoretical predictions
From the above model, I can therefore draw the following predictions:
1. A price decrease for a contraceptive method will increase the probability that a
given woman chooses that method.
2. When prices for two methods decrease simultaneously, it reduces the probability
that a women will choose no method. It will also likely result in substitution
from one method to the other, but the direction of that substitution must be
determined empirically.
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1.3.4. Other theoretical alternatives
The above model considers contraception purely as a preventive service. However,
there are alternative models that could be considered. Other models that have exam-
ined contraceptive choice have considered the possibility that contraceptive choice im-
pacts utility via sexual activity or relationship status (Collins and Hershbein, 2013).
Another important issue is that contraceptive choice is actually a dynamic, rather
than a static, process. An alternative modelling strategy would be to consider con-
traception as a form of future investment and use a human capital model such as
that of Grossman (1972). However, because my empirical strategy does not involve
modeling contraceptive choice dynamically, I believe that is beyond the scope of this
project.
Another possiblity is that women are employing some type of hyperbolic discounting
to their contraceptive product choice. LARC methods are cheaper over 5 or more
years of use, but their costs are concentrated up-front rather than spread over smaller
monthly or tri-monthly expenditures. Add to that the fact that LARC methods
require a smallbut uncomfortableprocedure to be inserted/implanted, and these
higher up-front costs may cause women who overweight the present relative to the
future to choose products like condoms or the pill instead. A recent study of fertility
and discounting that used inconsistent saving attitudes as a proxy for time incon-
sistency did ﬁnd empirical evidence that women who hyperbolically discount have
diﬀerent fertility patterns than women who do not (Wrede, 2011).
In addition, social networks have a potentially large impact on contraceptive choice,
and I could choose to model this more explicitly than simply adding a non-monetary
cost for Method 2 in my model above. An older study examining diﬀerences in con-
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traceptive method choice by country highlighted the fact that most countries have
one or two dominant methods at most, and that the dominant method varies widely
by country; in 1991, the two most commonly used methods in Belgium were the
pill (46.4%) and female sterilization (11.4%) while in South Korea they were female
sterilization (38.5%), male sterilization (12%) and condoms (10.2%), with only 3%
of user choosing the pill (Potter, 1999). It seems implausible that these diﬀerences
could be fully explained simply by a model of heterogenous preferences. A number
of studies in the demography literature have attempted to theoretically or empiri-
cally model contraceptive choice as inﬂuenced by social networks or social factors,
and have generally found that social networks are important in contraceptive choice
(Kohler, 1997; Kincaid, 2000; Montgomery and Casterline, 1996; Valente et al., 1997).
While interesting, any empirical analysis of network eﬀects would require some way
to identify networks of contraceptive users, something that isn't possible with the
data currently available to me.
One area where social networks may have a particularly large impact in the U.S.
is in IUD choice. In the 1970s, the then-most popular brand of IUD, the Dalkon
Shield, was found to be associated with increased risk of infection and subsequent
infertility. These ﬁnding were the subject of congressional hearings and considerable
press attention in the U.S. In the subsequent decade, all other IUD manufacturers
withdrew from the U.S. market, citing fears of lawsuits. IUD models currently on
the market have been extensively studied and found to be safe, but a generation of
women and providers in the U.S. still have a negative impression of the method. In
contrast, the Dalkon Shield product withdrawal had much less impact in Europe,
where it was less commonly used and where a copper IUD model remained available
during the 1970s and 1980s. Overall, rates of IUD use in Europe average 10-15% of
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contraceptive users, compared with 2% in the U.S in 2002 (Sonﬁeld, 2007). However,
there's some evidence that this trend is reversing in the U.S., as new and safer models
of IUDs are again growing in popularity, from 0.8% of women using contraception in
1995 to 5.6% in 2006-2010 (Jones et al., 2012).
Women may also simply choose their contraceptive products irrationally for other
reasons. There is certainly some suggestive evidence that this is true; see Section
1.2.1 for a detailed discussion of the literature that suggests that some women may
be unable to correctly estimate their risk of pregnancy or the potential costs of an
unplanned pregnancy. If this is the case, I could consider a model that incorporates
principles from the behavioral economics literature such as prospect theory.
Lastly, this model also currently ignores the potential positive externalities of contra-
ceptive use that have been found in the empirical literature. If access to contraceptives
truly results in positive economic externalities, then there is potentially a normative
analysis that could be done to estimate welfare gains from mandating coverage. How-
ever, since my empirical analysis does not estimate these gains, for now I have chosen
not to incorporate this into my model.
1.4. Outline
The remainder of this dissertation proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2, I estimate the
impact of state-level insurance coverage mandates using a nationally representative
survey, the National Survey on Family Growth. In Chapter 3, I analyze the same
state-level mandates using an administrative claims dataset. This second dataset al-
lows me to both better identify the women aﬀected by the state mandates, and to
search for evidence that the mandates causally impacted insurance coverage of contra-
ceptives. Chapter 4 contains an analysis of the impact of the Aﬀordable Care Act's
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mandate on OOP costs and utilization of contraceptives. In Chapter 5, I summa-
rize my empirical results, and discuss the policy implications, limitations, and future
research directions of the project.
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1.5. Tables and Figures
Figure 1: Contraceptive methods by mechanism and eﬀectiveness
Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC, 2014)
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CHAPTER 2 : The impact of state-level contraception coverage
mandates in survey data
2.1. Introduction
In this chapter, I examine the impact of state-level contraception coverage mandates
on OOP costs and contraceptive utilization using data from a nationally represen-
tative survey, the National Survey on Family Growth (NSFG). I ﬁnd no evidence
that the mandates impacted overall contraceptive utilization or the distribution of
methods chosen.
2.2. State-level mandates
Between 1999 and 2010, 29 states passed laws that mandated coverage of prescription
contraceptives. One mandatein Texaswas eﬀectively repealed several years after
passage, leaving 28 mandates currently in eﬀect. These mandates require private
health insurance plans to include coverage for prescription contraceptives at equiv-
alent cost-sharing levels to other covered prescription drugs. All employers that
self-insure are exempt from these mandates under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA). Once law, these mandates take eﬀect for an individual when
their plan renews for a new plan-year, most often in January of the year following the
mandate's eﬀective date.
Most of the state-level mandates require insurers to cover all FDA-approved forms of
contraception, although many allow insurers to use formularies to limit coverage to
certain brands. Emergency contraception is explicitly excluded by two of the states
(Wolters Kluwer, 2013). However, for all other mandates emergency contraception is
27
included only to the extent that it requires a prescription, and most brands are now
available OTC and therefore not included in the mandates.
These mandates vary across several dimensions. The ﬁrst is whether they speciﬁcally
mandate coverage of related outpatient contraceptive services in addition to prescrip-
tion drug and device coverage, i.e., whether a plan must cover both the cost of an IUD
and the cost of the insertion procedure. Mandates also vary by which categories of
religious employers can exempt themselves from the mandate. The Alan Guttmacher
institute (AGI), a nonproﬁt reproductive health policy research and advocacy orga-
nization, has classiﬁed these mandate into four exemption categories: none, limited,
broad and expansive. Table 1 lists which types of employers fall under these catego-
rizations (AGI, 2014).
Table 2 summarizes each mandate by eﬀective date, whether it included outpatient
coverage, and exemption category. The eﬀective date is when the mandate took
legal eﬀect, not when the law that included the mandate was passed. The mandates
included in Table 2 have been reconciled from three sources: the National Conference
of State Legislatures website, personal communications with the staﬀ of the Alan
Guttmacher Institute,1 and a Wolters Kluwer Law & Business White paper (NCSL,
2012; Wolters Kluwer, 2013; AGI, 2014).
There is suggestive evidence that these mandates were binding for some insurance
plans. The Kaiser Family Foundation's Employee Health Beneﬁts Annual Survey
asked about coverage of contraceptives for several years during the early 2000s. Fig-
ure 2 shows the overall rates of coverage for OCPs, all reversible methods, and ster-
ilization, broken out by workers in smaller ﬁrms (under 200 employees) and larger
ﬁrms (over 200 employees) from 2001 to 2004. For comparison, both ﬁgures include
1The eﬀective dates for each mandate were obtained from AGI by request.
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the percentage of workers with prescription drug beneﬁts and prenatal care beneﬁts.
Coverate rates for reversible methods and sterilization are presented as dots instead
of lines to reﬂect that those numbers were not reported in 2002 or 2004. For both
larger and smaller ﬁrms in 2001, prescription drugs and prenatal care were almost
universally covered during this period, with little change seen in rates of coverage
over time. In contrast, coverage of OCPs, reversible methods, and sterilization were
all signiﬁcantly lower, with 54% of workers at smaller ﬁrms and 69% of workers larger
ﬁrms oﬀered coverage of OCPs oﬀered by their plans. Coverage rates for all leading
reversible methods was only 31% for smaller ﬁrms and 45% for larger ﬁrms in 2001.
This coverage landscape was changing rapidly; by 2004, coverage of OCPs had risen
to 87% and 89% for smaller and larger ﬁrms, respectively. Similar rises were seen for
coverage of reversible methods and for sterilization (Levitt et al., 2000, 2001; Claxton,
2002; Claxton et al., 2003). This is the precise period in which the majority of the
contraceptive coverage mandates were being implemented.
Similarly, a cross-sectional AGI survey of private health insurance plans conducted in
both 1993 and 2002 found that private insurance coverage of birth control rose by 40
to 60 percentage points in this time period, depending on the birth control method.
In their 2002 survey, they also found single-state plans in states without mandates
were signiﬁcantly less likely to cover the ﬁve leading birth control methods than plans
in states with mandates (Sonﬁeld et al., 2004).
This evidence only demonstrates that the increase in state-level mandates co-occured
with an increase in the national rates of insurance coverage of contraceptives; to date,
I have not seen any study use an appropriate analytic approach to argue that it was
the passage of the mandates that directly caused an increase in insurance coverage
of contraceptives during this time period. It's possible that the rise of insurance
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coverage of contraceptives coincided with but was not caused by the increasing use of
state contraceptive coverage mandates. They could both have resulted from increased
consumer demand or political activism surrounding the issue of women's rights in the
workplace.
An unanswered question in the literature is why the insurance coverage of contracep-
tives was so much lower than that of other prescription drugs in the early 2000s. I
have not found a good explanation for why this was, but one possibility is demand
among consumers or selection into employers. If some employers employed primarily
men, older women, or women uninterested in contraception, they would be less likely
to oﬀer insurance coverage for those services. If this is the case, it would make it less
likely that insurance coverage mandates would have an eﬀect on utilization, because
the women in employers who did not oﬀer coverage prior to the mandate would have
lower demand in general for contraception.
2.3. Data: The National Survey of Family Growth
The National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG) is a nationally representative sur-
vey of women ages 14 to 45 that asks detailed questions concerning all aspects of
a woman's sexual activity and history, in addition to gathering other demographic
information concerning income, employment, and family circumstances. I combine
three waves of this survey (1995, 2002, and 2006  2010) to create a pooled cross-
sectional dataset that spans the time period during which the contraception coverage
mandates were passed. While my analysis includes data from all 50 states, the survey
only has data both pre- and post-mandate for 25 of the 29 mandates. The terms of
my data agreement do not allow me to disclose which mandates are missing from my
analysis.
30
I restrict my primary analysis sample only to women who report that they are covered
by a private health insurance plan. My sample size is 19,249 women, 5,592 of whom
were living in states with active contraceptive coverage mandates when they were
interviewed. For my primary analysis, I do not exclude women who were pregnant,
not sexually active or physically unable to become pregnant, because those choices
may be endogenous to the OOP cost of prescription contraceptives and therefore the
policy I am studying. I do perform some sensitivity analyses using a sample further
restricted to women seeking to avoid pregnancy who are physically able to become
pregnant.
I explore diﬀerent model speciﬁcations to see if my results are sensitive to my selection
of covariates. I create groups of variablesthe ones I considered the most important
a prioriand add them to the models sequentially to test for sensitivity to diﬀerent
categories of covariates. Table 3 lists the covariate groups I use for my analysis, along
with the condition indices (CIs) of the groups that I chose. The CIs vary from 16
to 50, suggesting that some of these covariates are deﬁnitely collinear. While high
CI values for groups of covariates can be a concern, they can be safely ignored if the
variance inﬂation factor on the coeﬃcient of interest remains low (Allison, 2012). The
ﬁrst two categories of covariates are either public or restricted variables available from
the NSFG survey. Contextual-variables at the county level from the NSFG have the
years the data was gathered for each wave listed in parentheses. The third category
of covariates, state-level covariates, are time-varying covariates from a dataset of
state-level laws that may impact a woman's access to contraceptives. These include
variables such as Medicaid coverage of family planning, laws that impact access to
abortion, generosity of state-level welfare beneﬁts, etc. This dataset was compiled
by Melissa Kearney and Philip Levine for their working paper examining trends over
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time in teen birth rates, and the sources of each of these covariates can be found in
their appendix (Kearney and Levine, 2012).2
Because the products available on the market changed during the time-frame of the
study, I collapse prescription birth control use into the following categories: short-
term hormonal (the pill, the patch or the ring), IUD, implant, injection, sterilization,
diaphragm or cervical cap, and emergency contraception. Women in the survey were
given the option to report using multiple methods of birth control at the same time, so
a women can be classiﬁed as using more than one prescription method. I deﬁne LARC
or long-term prescription contraceptive use as use of an IUD or an implant. Women
who reported only using non-prescription methods or no method were classiﬁed as
non-users of prescription contraception.
Accessing certain restricted variables requires performing all analyses in the National
Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) Research Data Center (RDC) in Hyattsville,
MD. Funding for these analyses was made possible by a grant from the Wharton Risk
Center Ackoﬀ Doctoral Student Fellowship.
2.4. Methods and analytic strategy
I use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence analysis to isolate the marginal eﬀect of passing a cov-
erage mandate upon contraceptive utilization. My two primary outcomes of interest
are use of any prescription contraceptive (the extensive margin of use) and use of any
long-acting prescription contraceptive (the intensive margin of use).
2This dataset was obtained upon request from Philip Levine, Professor of Economics at Wellesley
College.
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My general model is as follows:
P (Yits = 1) = f(β[1 = Mandate]ts + γt + θs +Xits + Zts)
Here, i indexes individuals, s indexes states and t indexes years. The independent
variable is equal to one if the woman is interviewed in a year following mandate
implementation in state s. This analysis includes state and year ﬁxed eﬀects. The
coeﬃcient of interest is β, which reﬂects the relative change in birth control utilization
after mandate implementation in states that implemented mandates compared with
states that did not implement mandates. I use linear probability models or ﬁxed-
eﬀects logit models for binary outcomes, and cluster robust standard errors at the
state level.
Vector Xits includes personal demographics, childhood experiences, prior sexual his-
tory and number of partners, prior contraceptive experience, economic circumstances,
and number of pregnancies. Geographic-level covariates included in Zts include
county-level restricted variables from the NSFG and time-varying state level vari-
ables concerning laws that may impact a woman's choice of contraceptives. See Table
3 for a detailed list of covariates.
I also examine diﬀerences between mandates with diﬀerent exclusion policies. Here
I use AGI's categories of mandates' exemption policies: none, limited, broad, or
expansive (Table 1). My empirical model to test for diﬀerences by mandate type is:
P (Yits = 1) = f(β1[1 = Mandate, none]ts + β2[1 = Mandate, limited]ts
+β3[1 = Mandate, broad]ts + β4[1 = Mandate, expansive]ts
+γt + θs +Xits + Zts)
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Here, β1 is the impact of a mandate with no exemptions allowed, while β2 through
β4 reﬂect the impact of mandates with the three possible exemption policies.
Mandates also vary by whether they include coverage of related outpatient services.
I examine the diﬀerence between these two types of mandates using a model very
similar to the above analysis of diﬀering exemption policies:
P (Yits = 1) = f(β1[1 = Mandate, no outpt covg]ts + β2[1 = Mandate, outpt covg]ts
+γt + θs +Xits + Zts)
Here, β1 is the impact of a mandate that doesn't include coverage of outpatient
services, and β2 is the impact of a mandate that does mandate coverage of outpatient
services.
My identiﬁcation strategy is sensitive to the typical assumption that drives identi-
ﬁcation for diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence models; that is, the possibility that states that
enacted mandates would have had diﬀerent trends in the absence of the mandates
than states without mandates. Probably the most concerning source of endogeneity
in this case is legislative endogeneity, that is, that states enacting these laws also
tend to enact other laws that may aﬀect contraceptive choice. I control for this by in-
cluding a comprehensive set of state-level controls for various legislative policies that
could potentially impact contraceptive choice, as described in the previous section.
I considered including parametric state-speciﬁc linear time trends to the model, but
for the majority of mandates I only have one or two periods prior to the mandate
implementation. In this situation, the trend that eﬀect size is diﬀerenced from is
almost entirely in the post-period, conﬂating policy eﬀects and trends (Angrist and
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Pischke, 2009). I therefore do not include parametric state-speciﬁc time trends in
these analyses.
2.5. Results
Table 4 shows weighted descriptive statistics for my NSFG analytic sample by man-
date status. There are diﬀerences between the two populations. In general, women
living in states with mandates are more likely to be Hispanic (14.6% vs. 7.35%), live
in non-rural areas (88.5% vs. 78.9%), be higher income (43.8% vs. 33.8% make more
than $60,000/year) and be non-religious (19% vs. 12.8%). Table 5 shows the overall
weighted average use of contraceptives methods by state mandate status. Cross-
sectionally, women in states with mandates are more likely to use prescription birth
control than women in states without mandates (41.2% vs. 40.5%), although this dif-
ference is not statistically signiﬁcant. Use of LARC (aka long-term) contraceptive
methods is twice as common in states with mandates as in states without, and this
diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant.
Figure 3 shows the percentage of women using prescription contraceptives by years
pre- and post-mandate, in the states that implemented mandates. There are some
clear trends over time, as use of sterilization appears to fall while LARC use and
short-term hormonal use increase, but there are no obvious changes in level or slope
following mandate implementation. Figure 4 shows rates of contraceptive use bro-
ken out by the year of mandate implementation. States with earlier mandates do
not appear to show increases in contraceptive use following mandate implementation
relative to states with mandates that were implemented later.
Table 6 shows the results for the baseline model, with and without diﬀerent sets
of covariates, for the outcome any prescription birth control use. The coeﬃcient
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of interest is approximately 0.02 for all speciﬁcations, representing a 2% increase
in the probability of prescription BC use, but no speciﬁcation achieves statistical
signiﬁcance. Table 7 shows the same speciﬁcations, but this time the outcome is use
of any LARC method. The coeﬃcient of interest is non-signiﬁcant and very close to
zero for all speciﬁcations.
Table 8 shows regressions with the mandates broken out by category of refusal pro-
vision. The reference category is states with no mandates. Although none of the
coeﬃcients achieve statistical signiﬁcance, there is a suggestive trend that the mag-
nitudes of the coeﬃcients of interest decrease as the refusal provisions grow more in-
clusive, i.e., as more businesses are allowed to exempt themselves from the mandates.
For instance, the coeﬃcient on states with mandates that allowed no exemptions is
0.04, decreasing to 0.02 for intermediate refusal categories, and decreases further to
-0.01 for mandates with expansive refusal provisions. Table 9 displays results from
the mandates broken out by whether the mandates speciﬁcally include coverage of
related outpatient contraceptive services. The reference category is states with no
mandates. The coeﬃcients of interest for these models are non-signiﬁcant.
Collinearity is a concern for models with many diﬀerent covariates, and can inﬂate
standard errors. I used the Stata command estat vif following my regressions to
examine models for collinearity that may be impacting my coeﬃcient of interest. Al-
though there was signiﬁcant collinearity between some of the regressors, the variance
inﬂation factor (VIF) on the coeﬃcient of interest for the fully-adjusted model (out-
come = any prescription contraceptive use) (Column 4 of Table 6) was still only
3.24, less than the rule-of-thumb value of 10. The VIF on the basic model with the
outcome any prescription contraceptive use (Column 1 of Table 6) was approximately
1.5. I'm therefore not too concerned that collinearity is inﬂating my standard errors
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for these models.
2.5.1. Robustness checks
I also conduct the following robustness checks for this analysis:
 I examine the models broken out by age and income category, and ﬁnd no
signiﬁcant results for any subgroups of women.
 I examine the models using a smaller analysis sample of non-pregnant women
both physically capable of becoming pregnant and seeking to avoid pregnancy.
This population, while potentially endogenous, is also the most likely to demand
contraceptives and so we might expect a stronger demand response in this sub-
population. Results for these analyses were also statistically insigniﬁcant.
 Models run using logit speciﬁcations were similarly insigniﬁcant.
 I also tried unweighted or diﬀerently weighted versions of models above. While
the coeﬃcient magnitudes were very similar, at times the coeﬃcients of interest
on unweighted models achieved statistical signiﬁcance. The results I report here
are the regressions done according to the instructions provided in the NSFG
documentation.
2.6. Discussion
My results suggest that the state-level contraception coverage mandates did not have
an impact on contraceptive use. There are several potential reasons why this may be
the case. It's possible that these mandates simply didn't bind because the majority
of plans already oﬀered coverage of contraceptives, although the available national
data I discuss in Section 2.2 suggests that there was a signiﬁcant subset of employers
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in my data who did not oﬀer coverage of contraceptives to their employees at the
beginning of my study period.
However, it is possible that the impact of the mandates themselves on insurance cov-
erage was small or nonexistent. The changes in insurance coverage of contraceptives
could have taken place concurrently with the implementation of mandates if both
were driven by consumer activism and increased policy discussions surrounding con-
traceptive coverage. Or the the change in coverage seen in surveys could be driven
primarily by increases in coverage among employers who self-insure their plans, driven
by consumer demand rather than regulatory requirement.
Another explanation for my results is that demand for contraceptives may be very
inelastic in privately insured populations. This would be consistent with the estimates
of demand elasticity for OCPs reported by Collins and Hershbein (2013) and from
studies of demand elasticity in the developing world. In the next chapter, I attempt
to distinguish between these possibilities using an administrative claims dataset.
2.6.1. Limitations
The primary limitation of the NSFG survey data is that it has a small number of
periods (1995, 2002, and 2006 - 2010). This makes it diﬃcult to test or control for
diﬀerential pre-trends in the treatment vs. control states. Additionally, although it
is possible to identify women in private health insurance, it's not possible to identify
women in fully-insured vs. self-insured plans. I address some of these challenges with
the analysis described in the next chapter.
It's also possible that I'm limited in my power to detect an eﬀect by the sample size
of the data. To do a post hoc power analysis, I must calculate a standardized eﬀect
size measure called Cohen's f 2. This eﬀect size is equal to a ratio of R2 values for
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the regression with and without the coeﬃcient of interest. If R2+ is the R
2 for my
baseline model, and R2− is the regression for my baseline model including all ﬁxed
eﬀects but excluding the contraception coverage mandate dummy, then:
f 2 =
R2+ −R2−
1−R2+
I plan to return to the RDC to perform this power calculation. But I can guess at a
range for now. For my baseline model, R2+ = 0.0139. If I assume that R
2
− = 0.0138
(an eﬀect size of f 2 = 0.001), then my baseline analysis including only state and year
ﬁxed eﬀects has a power of 99.2%. If I assume that R2− = 0.01385 (an eﬀect size of
f 2 = 0.0005), then my power falls to 87%. If I assume that R2− = 0.01381 (an eﬀect
size of f 2 = 0.0001), then my power falls to 28%. All of these calculations were done
with the free software G*Power 3.1.
The fact that I'm not able to separate out women in health plans oﬀered by self-
insured employers will also limit my power. Since self-insured employers are exempted
from state mandates, women in these plans can live in states with mandates but be
insured by exempted plans. This is a signiﬁcant proportion of my sample; according
to the Kaiser Employer Health Beneﬁts Annual Survey, the percent of people in
employer-sponsored health insurance oﬀered by self-insured employers ranged from
44-59% between 1996 and 2010 (Claxton et al., 2003, 2010). If I recalculate the power
analysis I've described above for a sample that is 50% smaller, for eﬀect sizes equal
to 0.001, 0.0005, and 0.0001, I get 92%, 70% and 25% power respectively. So halving
my sample size does reduce my power, but the eﬀect size is the larger determinant of
my statistical power.
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2.6.2. Future work
There are several additional analyses I plan to do on my next visit to the RDC. The
ﬁrst is to perform the post-hoc power analysis I describe in Section 2.6.1. The second
is to attempt to test whether the mandates caused changes in insurance coverage of
contraceptives. The NSFG has one variable concerning health insurance coverage of
contraception; women who report that they obtained a prescription for birth control
in the last 12 months are asked whether they self-paid for the method or whether
their insurance paid for it, or both. I can therefore use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
strategy to test whether women receiving birth control prescriptions report that their
insurance paid for that prescriptioneither in whole or in partat higher rates in
states with mandates. There are some potential issues with this analysis. The ﬁrst
is that any power limitations I have in my baseline analysis will be exacerbated in
this one, because the question was only asked of a subset of women. Secondly, I'm
concerned about systematic mis-reporting for this question. In particular, given the
low levels of understanding of how health insurance works in the general population,
I'm concerned that women purchasing their birth control at a pharmacy may report
that they self-paid, when in fact they paid a co-pay. If this is the case, this would
potentially bias me towards ﬁnding a null result for this question.
Lastly, I can also explore alternate weighting schemes for my analyses. In all of my
results thus far, I use the weights provided by the NSFG as instructed in the NSFG
documentation. However, I could consider an alternate weighting strategy, or consider
collapsing to the state-level to perform an analysis that weights each state equally.
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2.7. Tables & Figures
Figure 2: Private insurance coverage of contraceptives over time
Source: Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Education Research & Trust Employee
Health Beneﬁts Annual Survey Reports, 2001 to 2004.
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Table 1: AGI's exemption categories for state-level mandates
Type of employer
allowed an exemption
None Limited Broad Expansive
Chuches and church
associations
X X X
Religiously aﬃliated
schools and charities
X X
Hospitals X
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Table 2: Contraception coverage mandates by state
State Eﬀective
Date
Exemption
category
Outpatient
coverage
Pre &
post
NSFG
data?
Pre &
post OI
data?
Arizona 12/31/02 expansive yes
Yes for
25 of 29
mandates
yes
Arkansas 7/12/05 broad no yes
California 1/1/00 limited no
Colorado 1/1/11 none no yes
Connecticut 10/1/99 expansive no
Delaware 6/7/00 expansive yes
Georgia 7/1/99 none no
Hawaii 1/1/00 expansive yes
Illinois 1/1/04 expansive yes yes
Iowa 7/1/00 none yes
Maine 3/1/00 broad yes
Maryland 10/1/98 expansive yes
Massachusetts 1/1/03 broad yes yes
Michigan 8/21/06 broad yes yes
Missouri 1/1/02 expansive no yes
Montana 3/28/06 none yes yes
Nevada 10/1/99 none no
New
Hampshire
1/1/00 none yes
New Jersey 7/1/06 broad no yes
New Mexico 7/1/01 expansive no
New York 1/1/03 limited no yes
North
Carolina
1/1/00 broad yes
Oregon 1/1/08 limited yes yes
Rhode Island 1/1/01 broad no
Texas 1/1/2002 -
1/1/2004
none yes yes
Vermont 10/1/99 none yes
Washington 1/1/02 none yes yes
West Virginia 8/2/05 expansive yes yes
Wisconsin 1/1/10 none yes yes
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Table 3: NSFG analysis covariate groups
NSFG Basic Covariates
Age
Number of pregnancies
Marital status (categories)
Race/ethnicity (categories) Condition index = 19.73
Highest level of education (categories)
Income bins (categories)
Any abortion provider in the county (92/00/05)
(Yes = 1)
County family planning providers/10000 women
age 15-44 (94/00/06)
NSFG Additional Covariates
Metro status (categories)
County avg. abortions/1000 women age 15-44
(92/00/05)
Religion (categories)
Number of children in household
Employment status (categories)
Number of marriages Condition index ≈ 50
Has ever cohabitated (Yes = 1)
Number of unwanted pregnancies
Number of 'too soon' pregnancies
Number of abortions
Number of miscarriages
Number of additional expected children
State-level covariates
Welfare: TANF waiver (Yes = 1)
Welfare: Family cap (Yes = 1)
Medicaid abortion funding restriction (Yes = 1)
Parental consent/notiﬁcation for abortion for
minor (Yes = 1)
Condition index = 16.88
Mandatory wait period for abortion (Yes = 1)
Medicaid family planning waiver, income-based
(Yes = 1)
Medicaid family planning waiver, income-based,
excludes teens (Yes = 1)
Medicaid family-planning waiver, duration-based
(Yes = 1)
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics for NSFG analysis sample, by mandate status
States without
mandates
States with
mandates
N (unweighted) 13657 5592
Age 30.61 (0.14) 30.58 (0.20)
Cty Fam Plan
Providers per 10,000
1.11 (0.04) 1.29 (0.07)
Pregnancies 1.63 (0.03) 1.53 (0.04)
Unwanted
Pregnancies
0.17 (0.01) 0.2 (0.01)
Too Soon'
Pregnancies
0.45 (0.01) 0.42 (0.02)
Abortions 0.19 (0.01) 0.2 (0.01)
Miscarriages 0.26 (0.01) 0.24 (0.01)
Exp Addl Pregnancies 1.03 (0.03) 1.05 (0.03)
Marital status
Married 53.60% (0.76%) 50.30% (1.15%)
Cohabitating 6.06% (0.31%) 7.03% (0.50%)
Widowed 0.31% (0.06%) 0.33% (0.12%)
Divorced 5.67% (0.28%) 5.08% (0.41%)
Separated 1.93% (0.13%) 1.81% (0.24%)
Never married 32.40% (0.73%) 35.50% (1.01%)
Race/ethnicity
Hispanic 7.35% (0.37%) 14.60% (1.02%)
Non-hispanic white 77.40% (0.62%) 66.70% (1.50%)
Non-hispanic black 10.90% (0.49%) 11.00% (0.87%)
Non-hispanic other 4.37% (0.34%) 7.75% (0.63%)
Income
Under $10,000 4.12% (0.32%) 3.88% (0.37%)
$10,000 to $19,999 9.40% (0.37%) 8.36% (0.49%)
$20,000 to $24,999 5.78% (0.26%) 4.64% (0.43%)
$25,000 to $29,999 6.83% (0.24%) 5.70% (0.38%)
$30,000 to $39,999 15.00% (0.41%) 13.40% (0.67%)
$40,000 to $49,999 13.20% (0.44%) 8.99% (0.45%)
$50,000 to $59,999 11.90% (0.36%) 11.20% (0.59%)
$60,000 or more 33.80% (0.72%) 43.80% (1.18%)
Standard errors in parentheses. Means are given for continuous variables and per-
centages for categorical variables. All means, proportions and standard errors are
calculated using NSFG sample weights, with the exception of total number of obser-
vations.
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Table 5: Rates of Contraceptive Method Use by State Mandate Status
Prescription
BC use
Non-
prescription
or no use
Short-term
hormonal
Sterilization LARC use IUD Implant Injectable
No mandate 0.405 0.163 0.208 0.157 0.0153 0.0119 0.00342 0.0174
(0.00562) (0.00390) (0.00517) (0.00488) (0.00164) (0.00151) (0.000570) (0.00144)
Mandate 0.412 0.159 0.231 0.138 0.0243 0.0218 0.00248 0.0170
(0.0103) (0.00663) (0.00829) (0.00766) (0.00261) (0.00231) (0.000786) (0.00227)
Standard errors in parentheses. N = 30,769. Means and standard errors are calculated using NSFG survey weights.
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Figure 3: Contraception use pre- and post-mandate
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Figure 4: Contraceptive use by year of mandate implementation
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Table 6: LPM: Eﬀect of Coverage Mandate on Any Prescription BC Use
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Presc. BC use Presc. BC use Presc. BC use Presc. BC use
Contraceptive Coverage Mandate 0.0213 0.0218 0.0217 0.0244
(0.0165) (0.0163) (0.0159) (0.0197)
State Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
NSFG Basic Covariates No Yes Yes Yes
NSFG Addl Covariates No No Yes Yes
State-level covariates No No No Yes
Observations 30769 30769 30724 30724
R-squared 0.014 0.062 0.091 0.091
Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are linear probability models weighted with NSFG survey weights. See
Appendix for lists of covariates in each category. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.00149
Table 7: LPM: Eﬀect of Coverage Mandate on Any LARC Use
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Long-term BC use Long-term BC use Long-term BC use Long-term BC use
Contraceptive Coverage Mandate -0.00411 -0.00351 -0.00419 -0.00432
(0.00382) (0.00380) (0.00385) (0.00447)
State Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
NSFG Basic Covariates No Yes Yes Yes
NSFG Addl Covariates No No Yes Yes
State-level covariates No No No Yes
Observations 30769 30769 30724 30724
R-squared 0.016 0.025 0.033 0.034
Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are linear probability models weighted with NSFG survey weights. See
Appendix for lists of covariates in each category. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.00150
Table 8: LPM: Eﬀect of Coverage Mandate on Any Prescription BC Use by Mandate Refusal Provision
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prescription BC use Prescription BC use Prescription BC use Prescription BC use
Mandate no refusal 0.0426 0.0474 0.0425 0.0538
(0.0359) (0.0344) (0.0326) (0.0336)
Mandate limited refusal 0.0212 0.0314 0.0297 -0.00404
(0.0221) (0.0216) (0.0215) (0.0343)
Mandate broad refusal 0.0207 0.0161 0.0190 0.0540
(0.0252) (0.0246) (0.0245) (0.0301)
Mandate expansive refusal -0.0136 -0.0305 -0.0231 -0.0328
(0.0270) (0.0267) (0.0267) (0.0330)
State Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
NSFG Basic Covariates No Yes Yes Yes
NSFG Addl Covariates No No Yes Yes
State-level covariates No No No Yes
Observations 30769 30769 30724 30724
R-squared 0.014 0.062 0.091 0.092
Reference category is states with no mandate. Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are linear probability
models weighted with NSFG survey weights. See Appendix for lists of covariates in each category. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01
*** p<0.001
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Table 9: LPM: Eﬀect of Coverage Mandate on Any Prescription BC Use by Mandate Outpatient Coverage Provision
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prescription BC use Prescription BC use Prescription BC use Prescription BC use
Mandate no outpatient covg 0.0187 0.0260 0.0252 0.00597
(0.0200) (0.0198) (0.0194) (0.0247)
Mandate outpatient covg 0.0232 0.0190 0.0194 0.0357
(0.0214) (0.0208) (0.0204) (0.0237)
State Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
NSFG Basic Covariates No Yes Yes Yes
NSFG Addl Covariates No No Yes Yes
State-level covariates No No No Yes
Observations 30769 30769 30724 30724
R-squared 0.014 0.062 0.091 0.092
Reference category is states with no mandate. Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are linear probability
models weighted with NSFG survey weights. See Appendix for lists of covariates in each category. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01
*** p<0.001
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CHAPTER 3 : The impact of state-level contraception coverage
mandates in administrative claims data
3.1. Introduction
In this chapter, I analyze the impact of state-level contraceptive coverage mandates
using a large administrative claims dataset, the Clinformatics Data Mart from Op-
tumInsight. While I ﬁnd no evidence that these mandates impacted utilization, I do
ﬁnd some evidence that the mandates had an eﬀect on coverage of contraceptives.
For all analyses in this chapter I examine the same state-level mandates that I study
in Chapter 2. Please refer to Section 2.2 for a detailed description of the mandates
and the larger context of insurance coverage of contraceptives during this period.
I perform two analyses: an analysis of utilization of contraceptives and an analysis of
changes in the number of methods claimed within an employer group.
3.2. Data: Claims database from OptumInsight
The OptumInsight (OI) database contains longitudinal medical and prescription claims
information from May 2000 to June 2013. Although this dataset contains little per-
sonal information about individuals, it also has information not available from typical
survey data: an employer group identiﬁer, information on whether that employer fully
insures or self-insures, the exact type of birth control method delivered and the out-
of-pocket cost of the method to the patient. Using this data, I can quantify both the
impact of these mandates on contraception utilization and OOP costs.
In the absence of a contraceptive claim, it is impossible for me to know whether a
woman without a contraceptive claim was truly not using birth control or whether
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she was paying out-of-pocket or getting free or reduced cost birth control from an-
other provider. However, I can still quantify shifts into prescription contraceptive
use covered by a woman's primary health plan. As with my survey analysis above,
I can also study shifts from one method of birth control to another. I will use a
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence speciﬁcation to estimate the impact of a state level mandate
on the probability of a woman claiming a covered contraceptive. An advantage of the
OI dataset over the NSFG survey is that OI allows me to exclude women in plans
oﬀered by self-insured employers who are not subject to state mandates.
The OI claims ﬁles are very large; one quarter of medical claims typically has 20 to
25 million observations. I therefore use a 5% random sample of all individuals and
limit my analytic dataset to all women between the ages of 13 to 45 who are enrolled
in private health insurance in plans where the employer does not self-insure. My
utilization and OOP spending is calculated at the person-month level, as this is both
the smallest unit of coverage seen in the data and a natural unit of time to consider
contraceptive use.
I group prescription contraceptive methods into eight categories (Table 10), based on
their delivery method and the location where they are provided to patients. For each
woman in the data, I link her pharmacy and medical claims to identify whether she
had a claim for a contraceptive within each category in each month. If she did have a
claim for a prescription contraceptive, I calculate her monthly OOP expenses within
each contraceptive category. I also calculate total monthly medical and pharmaceu-
tical OOP spending for every woman.
Utilization and OOP spending are calculated using pharmacy claims for methods
delivered in a pharmacy, such as oral contraceptives, the contraceptive patch and
ring, and diaphragms and cervical caps. To identify contraceptive claims in the
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pharmaceutical claims data, I use a variable provided with the dataset that identiﬁes
prescriptions that fall into diﬀerent contraceptive categories. Utilization and OOP
spending are calculated from medical claims for methods provided in a physician oﬃce,
including the IUD, the implant and the contraceptive injection. Table 11 lists the
procedural and diagnostic codes that I use to identify the IUD, implant, contraceptive
injection and sterilization in the medical claims data.
The number of mandates that I can examine is limited by the fact that some mandates
were implemented prior to the start of the dataset. The fourth column of Table 2 lists
the states in which I have data available in the periods both pre- and post-mandate.
Of the 29 mandates that have been passed in the U.S., I have pre- and post-mandate
data for 15 of them in this analysis.
3.2.1. Estimating contraceptive utilization
For each woman, I create a binary variable equal to one if she claims a certain method
in a given month. I then estimate use of each method by combining information from
the data with typical use patterns.
For oral contraceptives, the patch, and the ring, contraceptive claims and contracep-
tive use are likely to be very similar, as most women receive a month's supply at once.
However, about a third of women in the data receive multiple months' supply at once.
The pharmaceutical claims data contains a days supply variable that estimates the
number of days covered by a dispensed medication. I created the following decision
rule to estimate duration of use: I assign only a month's use if the estimated days
supply was less than or equal to 31, two months of use if the days supply was between
31 and 61, and three months use if the supply was greater than 61.
Longer-term methods, such as IUDs, implants or the contraceptive injection, work for
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longer periods of time and this must be taken into account to estimate contraceptive
use. For the injection, a single shot provides three months of contraceptive eﬀect.
Therefore, if a woman had a claim in month one, I assume she is using that method
for that month as well as the subsequent two months. For IUDs, there are diagnostic
and procedure codes that can be used to identify if and when the IUD was removed.
If a woman had no removal claim during her period in the data, I estimate her use to
last until she exits the data or ﬁve years are up, whichever comes ﬁrst. If a woman
has no IUD insertion in the data but does have an IUD removal in a certain month,
I back-date her use of the IUD until the beginning of her enrollment period. There is
no diagnostic or procedural code that allow me to distinguish between surveillance,
removal or removal and re-insertion of an implant, so I therefore conservatively assume
an average of 1.5 years of use based on prior literature following Implanon users (Funk
et al., 2005). I also estimate use of female sterilization using medical claims ﬁles, and
if I observe a claim for sterilization I assume that method to be in use for all
subsequent periods an individual appears in the data.
Use of diaphragms, cervical caps, and emergency contraception are diﬃcult to es-
timate, since these methods must be used immediately before or after intercourse.
There is no way to estimate from the data which women may use these methods
infrequently vs. reliably, even if they have ﬁlled a prescription for them. I therefore
err on the side of underestimation and only assign women use of those methods for
the month in which they ﬁlled their prescription.
I use the term claim rate to refer to the percentage of women who had a claim for a
given method in a given month. I use the term usage rate to refer to the percentage
of women I estimate to be actively using a certain method in a given month, based
on the criteria I've outlined here.
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3.2.2. Estimating OOP spending on contraceptives
For OOP spending calculated from pharmaceutical claims, I use the total OOP spend-
ing reported in the data for that prescription medication. I also calculate a total
monthly pharmaceutical OOP value for every month a woman appears in the data.
When I calculate mean monthly OOP costs for methods delivered via the pharmacy,
I simply average the OOP costs reported for that method each month. These values
are an average monthly cost per-prescription, not per-month at the individual level,
because women often ﬁll prescriptions for several months at one time.
For the medical claims, there are often multiple claims for a single visit, and the data
contains an encounter variable that contains all claims relating to a single encounter
or oﬃce visit. I estimate OOP spending on contraceptives by aggregating all patient
cost-sharing for the encounter where the method or device itself was delivered. This
is because there are often OOP costs associated with the procedure that will be
coded separately from the procedure or device itself, such as painkillers, pregnancy
tests, etc., and I wish to include all associated OOP costs. However, this means that
it's possible that if a woman had several procedures during her visit, this method
may capture OOP expenditures for non-related procedures, such as childbirth or
abdominal surgery. In particular, I'm worried about sterilization, IUD or implant
insertions that occur immediately post-partum and may therefore be rolled into the
costs of childbirth. For sterilization in particular, one of the procedural codes for
sterilization speciﬁcally indicates that it was an add-on procedure performed during
a C-section. I therefore do not include OOP costs for C-section-related sterilizations
in my OOP cost analyses.
I do not include cost-sharing for physician appointments to discuss contraceptive
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management or obtain prescriptions for contraceptive medications or devices that
are then obtained at a pharmacy. I also do not include cost-sharing for IUD or
implant removal, because many women get one IUD removed and another reinserted
at the same appointment, making it diﬃcult to disentangle these costs. All costs are
presented in inﬂation-adjusted 2010 dollars.
3.2.3. Group-level identiﬁers
The OptumInsight data lack both a plan-level identiﬁer and information on when an
individual switches or renews their plan, so I cannot examine plan-level contraceptive
utilization or estimate when someone's particular plan added contraceptive coverage
or became subject to a mandate. However, the data does contain a employer group-
level identiﬁer, and I use it to the best of my ability. This group identiﬁer is a coarse
employer identiﬁer. In most cases, one group ID represents one employer, however,
when several small employers have collectively contracted with the insurer, they will
all have the same group ID. Similarly, a very large employer could potentially have
several group IDs contained within it if diﬀerent parts of the company contract with
the insurer separately.
It's also unclear how to identify people who have individual market coverage in the
data. About 10% of the employer group IDs in the data are associated with only one
individual, but it is unclear whether these are truly all individuals who purchased
their plans on the individual market. When I discussed this variable with the data
provider, they informed me that their data (unavailable to me) indicate that only
about 3% of group IDs in the data are truly individual plans; the remaining 7% were
coded as small group plans, but still assigned to single individuals. It's not clear
to me why this is the case, and so in general I view the group-level identiﬁer as an
imperfect employer identiﬁer.
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3.2.4. Issues with data quality in the Optum data
My initial time series of contraceptive utilization showed very strange trends in the
ﬁrst year of the data, from the second quarter of 2000 to the second quarter of 2001.
Overall contraceptive use during this time period appeared to drop rapidly, and then
increase rapidly, and then level oﬀ by the third quarter of 2001, after which it stayed
relatively stable. I was concerned this variation might be due to issues with the
quality of the data rather than true changes in utilization. I calculated the rates
of use of several other common prescription drugs during this same time period for
my sample, and saw the same trends in these prescriptions. I then went back and
calculated the rate of any prescriptions of any type among this population over this
time period, and found that overall rates of any claims over time also displayed the
same strange pattern. Figure 5 shows the rates of contraceptive claims compared
with rates of any pharmaceutical claims in the data. It's clear from this ﬁgure that
this early drop in rates of claims is not speciﬁc to contraceptives but instead reﬂects
overall prescription claim rates during these quarters in the dataset.
I therefore conclude that there are data quality issues with the prescription claims for
the ﬁrst four quarters of the data. I have brought this to the attention of the data
provider but have not received an explanation for why the patterns of prescription
claims in those quarters are so radically diﬀerent than in subsequent years. Because
of this, I drop the ﬁrst year of data and conduct all of my analyses beginning in
the third quarter of 2001. It's unfortunate that this issue arose, because this early
period was also the most common period in which mandates were being implemented.
Dropping these quarters of the data meant that I lost the pre-mandate periods for
several mandates enacted in 2001.
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3.3. Analysis of contraceptive utilization
Using a 5% sample of individuals, I analyze the data for commercially-insured women
ages 13 to 45 who have one or more months of insurance coverage between 2001m7
and 2011m12, and who are not in plans oﬀered by employers who self-insure. Some
women are enrolled in multiple plans at one time. I keep the majority of these women
in the dataset, but I do drop small numbers of women who are enrolled simultaneously
in multiple plans that vary by state, fully-insured vs. self-insured status, year of birth,
consumer-driven health plan status, or private vs. public insurance.
One of the mandates, in Texas, was removed after two years. For all analyses, I drop
observations from Texas after the mandate was removed.
In principle, this dataset also allows for person-level ﬁxed eﬀects. However, imple-
menting an individual-level ﬁxed eﬀects model is computationally infeasible without
taking a very small sample of the data and potentially sacriﬁcing generalizibility of
the results. I therefore do not use person-level ﬁxed eﬀects for the following mod-
els. However, in future work I hope to explore the possibility of implementing a
ﬁrst-diﬀerenced model at the individual level.
3.3.1. Stacked diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence analysis
Due to the long time period over which data is available, I create a stacked dataset
with of cohorts of mandate implementation. This speciﬁcation is very similar to a
standard diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence speciﬁcation when the treatment begins at diﬀerent
times for diﬀerent units, but it has a more explicit comparison group limited to a set
window of time around each mandate (Gormley and Matsa, 2011; Gormley, 2015).
Each mandate gets its own cohort, unless multiple mandates went into eﬀect on the
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same day, in which case I group those mandates together. For each cohort, the month
of mandate implementation becomes the zero month, and I limit the data to four
years pre- and post-mandate. The states where the mandates were implemented at the
same time are the treatment group for each cohort, and if another state implemented
a mandate during this window of time in a non-zero month, I drop the post-mandate
observations for that state. The control group for each cohort is therefore all the
observations within states whose mandate status did not change during this window,
and all of the pre-mandate observations for states who implemented mandates in a
non-zero month during this time window. These cohorts are then stacked to create
a ﬁnal analytic dataset.
This analysis has the advantage of examining a more standardized window of time
around each mandate. It also allows much more direct visualization of the data, with
a clear treatment and control group for each cohort whose trends can be examined
pre- and post-mandate implementation. One of the consequences of structuring the
data in this fashion is that individual observations are duplicated multiple times
throughout the dataset, however, this does not bias the results as long as the standard
errors are clustered at the level of the treatment (in this case, the cohort-state level).
My model is speciﬁed as follows:
Ycims = f(γcm + θcs + β[1 = Mandate]cms +Xims)
Here, i indexes individuals and s indexes states, m indexes months, and c indexes
mandate cohort. All speciﬁcations therefore include time-cohort and state-cohort
ﬁxed eﬀects. For some regressions, I also add in a state-cohort-speciﬁc linear trend,
t × θcs. The coeﬃcient of interest is β, which is the marginal impact of a mandate
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in the treatment states relative to the control states. Individual covariates included
in Xits include age, race, and the median education level of that individual's census
tract. Of these, only age is time-varying; the other two are only available at one point
in time in the data.
My key dependent variable is the probability of contraceptive use by method and
among diﬀerent age groups. I examine both extensive and intensive outcomes, that is,
both the probability of any use and the probability of use of a certain type of method
conditional on use of any prescription contraceptive. For intensive outcomes, I group
methods to be either short-term (the pill, patch, ring, injection or diaphragm/cervical
cap), long-term (the IUD and implant) or permanent (sterilization).
As a sensitivity check, I also estimate a dynamic version of the above speciﬁcation,
replacing the single coeﬃcient of interest with a coeﬃcient for treatment states in-
teracted with a set of pre and post-mandate dummy variables. The year of mandate
implementation (year zero) is excluded as the comparison group.
P (Yims = 1) = f(γcm + θcs +
∑−1
t=−4 βt × λt × [1 = Treatment]cs
+
∑3
t=1 βt × λt × [1 = Treatment]cs +Xims)
This ﬂexible speciﬁcation has two advantages. First, I can check for pre-trends in
states with and without mandates as a identiﬁcation test. Secondly, I can test whether
there are any longer-term impacts of the mandates that occur in the years after
implementation. As with the baseline model above, I test this model on both the
extensive (overall rate of use) and intensive (types of methods chosen) margins. For
the intensive margin of use, I divide the methods into three categories: sterilization,
LARC methods (the IUD and implant) and short-term methods (everything else) and
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run them on the subset of women actively using contraception in the dataset.
3.3.2. Results from utilization analysis
Figure 6 shows the overall rates of claims and estimated rate of use for any prescription
contraceptives in the data over time. Figure 7 shows use over time, grouped by
the approximate year of mandate implementation. The mandates are grouped into
ﬁve categories: 1999 to 2001, 2002 to 2003, 2004 to 2006, 2007 to 2011, and no
mandate. There are no immediately obvious diﬀerences in utilization between states
that implemented mandates earlier vs. later.
Because diﬀerent mandates went into eﬀect for diﬀerent states in diﬀerent years, I
found that the simplest way to visualize the data was to disaggregate my stacked
dataset and create a ﬁgure for utilization in each mandate cohort. That way, for each
time period I can examine the rate of use in the treatment states compared with the
control states. There are eleven mandate cohorts, and their usage rates over time are
shown in Figure 8. Examining these ﬁgures, there seem to be very little change in the
treatment states relative to control states following mandate implementation. There
are a few interesting outliersin particular, there is a large drop in contraceptive use
in Michigan following the mandate implementation.
Table 12 shows the results of the regression analysis for the outcome Prob(Any Use)
for all women and for subgroups of women by age. There is no statistically signiﬁcant
change in overall rates of contraceptive utilization following mandate implementation.
Table 13 shows the same model speciﬁcation for the probability of using a particular
method conditional on using any prescription contraceptives, and similarly ﬁnds no
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of the mandates on intensive utilization.
For my dynamic diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence models of utilization, I present the results
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as ﬁgures with coeﬃcient estimates and 95% conﬁdence intervals plotted. For all
of these models, the year of mandate implementation is the comparison group for
the coeﬃcient estimates. Figure 9 presents the results of the dynamic model for
the extensive margin of use. None of the coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. Figures 10, 11, and 12 present the results for conditional use
of short-term methods, LARC methods, and sterilization respectively. Similar to
the extensive margin, almost none of the coeﬃcients are statistically diﬀerent from
zero. There are some suggestive potential trends. For instance, the use of short-
term methods appears to increase in years two and three following the mandate. In
contrast, there is potentially a negative pre-trend in the use of LARC methods in
states with mandates relative to those without. These ﬁndings are potentially worth
further investigation, but it is diﬃcult to draw deﬁnite conclusions from them given
their lack of statistical signiﬁcance.
Overall, my results in this analysis suggest that there were no signiﬁcant changes in
overall rates of contraceptive use or the distribution of methods chosen by contracep-
tive users.
3.3.3. Robustness checks
I perform several sensitivity analyses and robustness checks for these results:
 Add additional time-varying state-level covariates: I have a dataset of time-
varying state-level covariates that may be correlated with contraceptive use at
the state level that I use in my analysis of the NSFG survey data in Chapter 2.
It does not include 2011, the ﬁnal year of the OI dataset. I have run my baseline
analyses excluding 2011 and adding in these state-level covariates, and results
were qualitatively unchanged, except that in some model speciﬁcations the co-
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eﬃcient of interest became negative and signiﬁcant, in the opposite direction
than would be expected from the policy change.
 Examine extensive and intensive use by age group: Younger women, particularly
teens, tend to use contraceptives at lower rates and be lower income than older
women. I examined the intensive and extensive margins of use by age group,
but found no diﬀerential eﬀects of the mandate when comparing across ages.
 Discrete time survival analysis: Because women may most actively choose their
birth control when they ﬁrst enroll in a new plan, I conducted a discrete time
survival analysis, with the outcome being the probability of ﬁrst use of a con-
traceptive following entry into the dataset. I experimented with models on both
the extensive and intensive margins of use, and found no signiﬁcant eﬀects on
utilization in any of the models.
 Analysis of OOP costs: I conducted a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence analysis with OOP
costs of diﬀerent methods as the dependent variable. In general results were
non-signiﬁcant and sensitive to model speciﬁcation.
3.4. Analysis of changes in the within-group number of methods claimed
The group-level identiﬁer is coarser than a plan-level identiﬁer, and it can contain
multiple small employers and/or multiple plans. Because of this, coverage of diﬀerent
contraceptive methods could vary within-group. However, if even one plan adds
coverage of a new method in response to a mandate, there could conceivably still
be an increase in the number of methods claimed within that group. I therefore
estimate the number of methods claimed within groups in the 12 months preceding
and following a mandate to see if I can detect a diﬀerential change in groups in
treatment states relative to control states.
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Examining within-group patterns required drawing a diﬀerent sample of the Optum
data. My initial sample was a 5% sample of individuals, which meant that many
individuals were drawn in the sample without the other people in their group. I
therefore drew a 5% sample of groups and used it to create a new sampled dataset.
3.4.1. Estimating contraceptive utilization
Contraceptive use and OOP price were estimated in the same manner as described
above, with one exception. Drawing a simple sample of group IDs meant that women
who switched groups but remained in the dataset would disappear. This potentially
posed a problem in estimating contraceptive use, since I use the longitudinal nature
of the data to estimate use within a woman over time, and I didn't want to lose
information unnecessarily. For instance, if a woman received a sterilization procedure
when she was in one group and then switched to another group, keeping one group
and not the other would introduce measurement error in the data. To address this
issue, I kept all periods in which a woman was in the dataset if she appeared at all in
a sampled group. I then used all available periods to estimate utilization. However,
when I perform group-level analyses, I drop the observations for which a woman did
not appear in a sampled group.
3.4.2. Estimating group-level patterns of coverage
My primary outcome is the number of methods claimed in a group in a given month.
As with my other analyses above, I conduct a stacked diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence analysis,
creating mandate cohorts that are then stacked into one dataset. However, many
of the groups contain very small numbers of women, and given that even the most
commonly-used methods are often not claimed at the monthly level, I concluded
that the yearly level was a more appropriate unit of analysis for trying to impute
66
group-level coverage of contraceptive methods.
For each mandate cohort, I keep only observations in the twelve months immediately
preceding and immediately following the implementation of a mandate. I drop groups
that self-insure, and I also drop groups that partially self-insure, that is, some of their
plans were self-insured and some were not. Many groups also cross state boundaries;
because this analysis is conducted at the group level rather than the state level, this
was only an issue if the group overlapped both a treatment and a control state in a
given cohort. Because these are all groups that do not self-insure, I assumed that if
a group crossed state boundaries, they would have to be compliant with the state-
level insurance coverage mandates in a treatment state. I therefore treat groups that
cross between treatment and control states as essentially two separate groups, one
treatment and one control, and analyze them separately in the data.
For each group, I then count the number of contraceptive methods for which a claim
appears in both the 12 months preceding and the 12 months following a mandate
implementation. I also examine whether a claim for a certain type of method appears
in the group's claims in the pre-period, post-period, or both.
3.4.3. First-diﬀerence analysis
Ideally, I would perform a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence analysis using group-level ﬁxed
eﬀects, using a model speciﬁcation as follows:
Ygtc = β[1 = Mandate]gtc + λ[1 = Post]tc + θgc + gtc
Here, g indexes group, c indexes cohort, and t indexes time, which in this analysis
has been collapsed to two periods, the 12 months pre and post-mandate. Ygt is the
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number of methods claimed by women within that group in each time period.
However, there are too many groups in my data to include group-level ﬁxed eﬀects
in the model. Instead I perform a ﬁrst diﬀerence analysis, subtracting the values of
each regressor in the ﬁrst period from their values in the second period. Only groups
with claims in both periods remain in the data, and the cohort-time and cohort-group
ﬁxed eﬀects drop out, leaving the model as follows:
(Ygc,t=1 − Ygc,t=0) = β[(1 = Mandate)t=1 − (1 = Mandate)t=0]gc + (gc,t=1 − tc,t=0)
The outcome is now the diﬀerence in number of claimed methods within group be-
tween the pre- and post-periods, and (1 = Mandate)t=1 − (1 = Mandate)t=0 only
takes a value equal to one for groups in treatment states. Standard errors are robust
to heteroskedasticity. Because I have reason to believe that the variance in the num-
ber of methods claimed per group increases as group size decreases, in some models
I weight by the square root of the number of women in the group.
I also estimate the above model for each type of method. In that case, the dependent
variable, Ygc,t=1 − Ygc,t=0, can take a value of 0 if there was no claim for a certain
method in either period, 1 if there was a claim in the post-period but not the pre-
period, and −1 if there was a claim in the pre-period but not the post-period.
3.4.4. Regression results
On average, the non-self-insured groups in the dataset are very small. About 50%
have less than 5 women, another 25% have 6 to 10 women, another 15% have 10 to
25, and the remaining 10% have 25 or more women. Given these small numbers of
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women per group, it's unsurprising that the median number of methods claimed in
a year is one. Figure 13 shows the mean number of methods claimed, by month, for
groups in treatment states vs. control states, broken out by mandate cohort. The
time series are rather mixed; some seem to suggest that the mean number of methods
claimed per group rose in treatment groups in comparison to control groups following
mandate implementation, while others seem to suggest that it fell.
However, the ﬁgures present pooled averages over time, while my regression analysis
considers only the within-group change in number of methods claimed per month. Ta-
ble 14 shows the results of my regression analysis. I perform the analysis three ways,
ﬁrst using unweighted OLS with a simple treatment dummy, then OLS weighted
by group size, and then unweighted OLS adding an interaction with the number of
women in the group. In Column 1, we see that the coeﬃcient of interest is statisti-
cally signiﬁcant but has a very small magnitude of an additional 0.04 methods per
group. In Column 2, I present the same model, weighted by the square root of the
number of women in the group. This coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant and has a
large magnitude (0.313) relative to the mean number of methods claimed within a
group over this period. When I leave the regression unweighted and instead add an
interaction for the size of the group, it's clear that this eﬀect is being driven almost
completely by groups with more than 25 women. The coeﬃcients on groups with zero
to 5 women and 10 to 25 women are non-signiﬁcant, and the coeﬃcient on group with
6 to 10 women is statistically signiﬁcant but small in magnitude (0.07). However, the
coeﬃcient for groups with more than 25 women is 0.42, which means that larger
groups that did not self-insure saw an average increase of 0.42 methods claimed in
the year following mandate implementation, compared with groups of the same size
in control states. Because I can only know if a certain group's plans covered a given
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method if a women in that group claims that method, I don't interpret these results
as indicating that the smallest groups did not see a change in insurance coverage
while the largest groups did. My ability to detect an eﬀect of a mandate increases
with group size, and therefore the variance of the number of methods within a group
increases as group size decreases. I therefore present the remaining analyses using
OLS weighted by group size only.
Tables 15 and 16 present the within-group change in the probability of a given method
being claimed in groups in treatment states vs. control states. Table 15 presents the
results for the short-term methods in the data, and we see that almost the entire
magnitude of the eﬀect can be explained by increased rates of claims for the patch and
the injection. In contrast, the rates of claims for the implant actually fall slightly, and
the remaining methods are non-signiﬁcant. These results suggest that the mandates
did cause more methods to be covered by insurance plans, speciﬁcally the injection
and the patch.
3.4.5. Robustness checks:
I perform several robustness checks for this analysis:
 Dropping cohorts: I re-ran these models while sequentially dropping one cohort
at a time. The results were very similar in both magnitutes and statistical
signiﬁcance for all subsets, suggesting that one cohort in particular is not driving
these results.
 Analysis of within-group rate of claims: Rather than using a diﬀerenced binary
variable as my outcome, I used the within-group change in rate of claims by
method as my outcome. Results for the patch were similar to those reported in
Tables 15, but the results for the injection and the implant became statistically
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insigniﬁcant.
3.5. Discussion
I ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects of the mandates on contraceptive utilization,
either at the extensive (overall rates of use) or intensive (the type of method chosen)
margins. I conduct a fairly extensive analysis of utilization, using multiple model
speciﬁcations and examining diﬀerences in usage by age group, ﬁnding almost uni-
formly non-signiﬁcant results.
When I turn to testing whether the state mandates had any impact on insurance
coverage of contraceptives, I ﬁnd evidence that they did. There is an increase in the
number of contraceptive methods claimed within a group following mandate imple-
mentation, speciﬁcally, in the rates of within-group claiming of the patch and the
injection. But either the change in coverage was not frequent enough, or demand
was inelastic enough, that overall rates of utilization and the distribution of methods
chosen were unchanged.
An unanswered question from thse analyses is why I am ﬁnding increased rates of
within-group claims for some methods for my group-level analysis, but no increased
rate of use for those same methods in my individual-level utilization analyses. This
could be explained by the fact that in general my estimates from my utilization anal-
ysis are imprecisely deﬁned. In general, use of all non-OCP methods is infrequent in
the data, and so it is correspondingly diﬃcult for me to detect an eﬀect on utilization
of those methods. In contract, my group-level analyses are designed to be sensitive to
any new additional method being claimed within a group, because the within-group
sum is increased by one whenever a new method is claimed, regardless of the method.
In addition, in my group-level analysis I examine only changes in claims, not in use.
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In Section 3.2.1 I describe how I used the patterns of claims by method to estimate
use of diﬀerent methods in my data. It's possible that this estimation strategy added
additional measurement error to my utilization analysis, making it more diﬃcult to
detect any true eﬀects. I could consider re-doing my utilization analysis as an analysis
of rates of claims instead. Another possible explanation for my results is that for my
group-level analysis, my window of time pre- and post-mandate is restricted to a year,
while my window for the utilization analysis is four years.
3.5.1. Limitations
This analysis has some important limitations. The lack of plan-level information and
a plan-level identiﬁer limit my ability to impute plan-level coverage of contraceptives.
In addition, the dataset has very limited individual-level covariates that I can use in
my analysis.
My OOP cost estimates almost certainly underestimate the total cost of obtaining
contraception for women in my sample. Imprecise diagnostic codes and variation
in coding practices across providers makes it diﬃcult to diﬀerentiate appointments
that included discussions of contraceptive use from appointments made for the sole
purpose of obtaining a new contraceptive prescription. I therefore exclude these
from encounters from my estimates. Similarly, I do not currently include the cost of
removals in my estimates for IUDs or implants.
Another limitation of this analysis is that my dataset, while very large, only comes
from one insurer. My results therefore may not be generalizable to the nation as
a whole. Given this insurer's large market share, however, I believe my results are
still relevant because they reﬂect the experience of a large subset of the group health
insurance market in the U.S.
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3.5.2. Future directions
There are several additional explorations I hope to implement with this analysis. The
ﬁrst is to use women in plans oﬀered by employers who self-insure as an additional
control group in a triple-diﬀerence analysis. Secondly, I plan to investigate the fea-
sibility of exploring individual-level analyses, perhaps in a ﬁrst-diﬀerence framework
as I did with my group-level analyses here.
Future research on these state mandates will need better data on how insurance
coverage of prescription contraceptives actually changed in response to a mandate. An
ideal dataset for studying these mandates would contain some plan-level information
about the OOP cost of prescription contraceptives for all women, not just the women
who actually purchased. In other words, it would contain counterfactual OOP prices
faced by women who chose not to consume contraceptives. Although my results
suggest that demand for contraceptives appears to be unresponsive to price, I could
quantify a demand elasticity for contraceptives much more exactly with better data
on the actual change in OOP cost faced by women.
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3.6. Tables & Figures
Table 10: Contraceptive method categories in OI dataset
Category Delivery method Delivery
location
Patient costs
included in
OOP total
Oral
contraceptive
Oral Pharmacy Cost of
medication
Emergency
contraceptive
Oral Pharmacy Cost of
medication
Patch Cutaneous Pharmacy Cost of device(s)
Ring Intravaginal Pharmacy Cost of device(s)
Diaphragm or
cervical cap
Barrier Pharmacy Cost of device(s)
IUD Intrauterine
device
Physician
oﬃce
Cost of device &
insertion
procedure
Implant Subcutaneous
device
Physician
oﬃce
Cost of device &
insertion
procedure
Injection Injection Physician
oﬃce
Cost of
medication &
injection
procedure
Female
sterilization
Surgical Oﬃce or
hospital
Cost of
procedure
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Table 11: Diagnosis & procedure codes used to identify contraception provided in a
physician oﬃce in OI dataset
Type of
Method
ICD-9
Diagnosis
ICD-9
Procedure
CPT-4 HCSC
IUD
insertion
V25.11,
V25.13
697 58300 J7300,
J7302
IUD
removal
V25.12 9771 58301
Implant
insertion
V25.5 J7307
Injection J1050,
J1051,
J1055
Female
steriliza-
tion
V252 58565,
58600,
58605,
58611,
58615,
58670,
58671
A4264
Figure 5: Rates of claims and estimated use including data from 2000m5 to 2001m6
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Figure 6: Extensive and intensive margins of contraceptive use, by month among
fully-insured women
Figure 7: Mean use by over time by year of mandate implementation
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Figure 8: Rate of use of any method by months pre- and post-mandate, by individual
mandate cohort
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Table 12: Stacked Diﬀ-in-diﬀ: Eﬀect of state mandate on any contraceptive use by women in fully-insured plans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All All 13-20 13-20 21-30 21-30 31-45 31-45
State Mandate 0.000790 -0.00407 -0.000725 0.000887 0.000468 -0.00263 -0.000794 -0.00544
(0.00577) (0.00338) (0.00294) (0.00322) (0.00972) (0.00738) (0.00680) (0.00483)
Individual
controls
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort-Time
Fixed Eﬀects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort-State
Fixed Eﬀects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort-State
linear trends
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 46120230 46120230 9689951 9689951 12379106 12379106 24051173 24051173
R2 0.011 0.011 0.081 0.081 0.022 0.023 0.026 0.027
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Outcome in all regressions is the probability of any prescription contraceptive use. Standard errors are cluster-robust at the cohort-state level.
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Table 13: Stacked Diﬀ-in-diﬀ: Eﬀect of state mandate on type of contraceptive methods chosen by users in fully-insured
plans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Short-term use Short-term use LARC use LARC use Sterilization Sterilization
State Mandate 0.00606 0.000303 -0.0127 -0.00189 0.00437 -0.0000126
(0.00714) (0.00495) (0.00665) (0.00529) (0.00338) (0.00276)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort-Time Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort-State Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort-State linear trends No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 8649586 8649586 8649586 8649586 8649586 8649586
R2 0.091 0.092 0.042 0.044 0.069 0.069
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Outcome in all regressions is the probability of type of method conditional on any prescription contraceptive use. Standard errors are
cluster-robust at the cohort-state level.
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Figure 9: Dynamic model: Any use
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Figure 10: Dynamic model: Conditional use of short-term methods
Figure 11: Dynamic model: Conditional use of LARC methods
Figure 12: Dynamic model: Conditional use of sterilization
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Figure 13: Mean number of methods claimed by group, by individual mandate cohort
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Table 14: Eﬀect of state mandates on number of methods claimed by group
(1) (2) (3)
Unweighted OLS Weighted by group size Unweighted OLS
1(Mandate, post) - 1(Mandate, pre) 0.0400∗∗ 0.313∗∗ -0.00590
(0.0136) (0.119) (0.0124)
Mand x 6 to 10 0.0739∗
(0.0363)
Mand x 10 to 25 -0.0341
(0.0445)
Mand x 25 or more 0.420∗∗∗
(0.0811)
Constant 0.0297∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.0297∗∗∗
(0.00321) (0.0269) (0.00321)
Observations 62248 62248 62248
R2 0.000 0.002 0.001
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Outcome in all regressions is the within-group change in number of methods claimed from the 12 months pre-mandate to the 12 months
post-mandate.
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Table 15: Eﬀect of state mandates on type of short-term method claimed within group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OCP Ring Patch Injection
1(Mandate, post) - 1(Mandate, pre) 0.00684 -0.00560 0.203∗∗∗ 0.0427∗
(0.00595) (0.0258) (0.0407) (0.0212)
Constant 0.00226∗ 0.0629∗∗∗ 0.00399 0.00219
(0.00112) (0.00624) (0.00796) (0.00522)
Observations 62248 62248 62248 62248
R2 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses. All models weighted by group size. Standard errors are robust.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Outcome in all regressions is the change in type of method claimed from the 12 months pre-mandate to the 12 months post-mandate.
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Table 16: Eﬀect of state mandates on type of long-term methods and sterilization claimed within group
(1) (2) (3)
IUD Implant Sterilization
1(Mandate, post) - 1(Mandate, pre) 0.00454 -0.0104∗ 0.0500
(0.0429) (0.00479) (0.0445)
Constant 0.0545∗∗∗ 0.00789∗ 0.00554
(0.00855) (0.00336) (0.00672)
Observations 62248 62248 62248
R2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses. All models weighted by group size. Standard errors are robust.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Outcome in all regressions is the change in type of method claimed from the 12 months pre-mandate to the 12 months post-mandate.
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CHAPTER 4 : The impact of the Aﬀordable Care Act mandate
4.1. Introduction
Beginning in August 2012, the Aﬀordable Care Act began requiring private health
insurance plans to cover prescription contraceptives with no consumer cost-sharing.
In this chapter, I use the OptumInsight data to examine the impact of the Aﬀord-
able Care Act (ACA) mandate on the OOP price of contraceptives and post-mandate
contraceptive utilization. I ﬁnd strong evidence that the OOP price has fallen sub-
stantially following the implementation of the mandate, but only very small changes
in extensive or intensive utilization in response to this decrease in OOP price.
4.1.1. The Aﬀordable Care Act mandate
The ACA mandate goes further than the state-level mandates I've examined in prior
chapters. It requires that preventive servicesa category of services which includes
both prescription contraceptives and their related servicesbe covered with zero con-
sumer cost-sharing. This mandate went into eﬀect on August 1st, 2012, and requires
that insurance plans come into compliance at the beginning of the subsequent plan-
year, which for many women was January 1st, 2013. This mandate includes all
FDA-approved contraceptive methods, including female sterilization and prescription
emergency contraception, but excludes abortifacients and over-the-counter emergency
contraception (Kraemer, 2014).
This mandate applies nationally, with exceptions allowed for grandfathered plans
and religious employers. Grandfathered plans are plans that have not substantially
changed their cost-sharing requirements since March 2010. These plans are gradually
being phased out of the employer-sponsored health insurance (ESHI) marketplace
86
but still currently enroll a signiﬁcant subset of employees. The 2013 Kaiser Employee
Health Beneﬁts Survey found that nationally 36% of covered workers were enrolled in
a grandfathered health plan, down from 48% in 2012 (Claxton et al., 2013). Grandfa-
thered plans in the individual marketplace could not enroll new members after March
2010, but grandfathered plans in the employer-based market can still enroll new em-
ployees as long as the ﬁrm has maintained consecutive enrollment in the plan since
March 2010.
Religious employersas deﬁned by the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS)are exempt from the ACA mandate. HHS has also issued a special accomoda-
tion allowing other non-proﬁt religious organizations, such as hospitals or universities,
to shift the responsibility of requiring contraceptive coverage to the insurer, rather
than the employer (HHS, 2013). In June 2014 the Supreme Court ruled that closely
held corporations whose shareholders consider themselves religious are also not sub-
ject to the mandate. Although a ﬁnal decision has not yet been made, the current
administration is expected to extend the same accomodation to these employers that
it extended to non-proﬁt religious organizations. However, the constitutionality of
this accomodation has also been challenged and is being actively litigated (Annas
et al., 2014).
The law requires that insurance companies cover all FDA-approved methods of
contraception, but insurance companies are not required to cover every birth control
brand in the market. Instead, insurance companies are allowed to employ reasonable
medical management or RMM, to contain costs. Two recent reports have found
that insurers are interpreting this RMM allowance in varied ways, and some are
interpreting it so broadly that they are potentially in violation of the law (Sobel et al.,
2015; Benyo et al., 2015). For example, some companies were not covering the patch
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or the ring, arguing that these methods were equivalent to OCPs because they use the
same hormones. One company surveyed covered the hormonal IUD but not the copper
IUD. In response to these reports, on May 11th, 2015, the Department of Health and
Human Services issued a new Frequently Asked Questions memo concerning which
methods are required to be covered by the law. These guidelines specify that insurers
must cover at least one brand in each of the 18 FDA-approved contraceptive method
categories with no cost-sharing. Within each category, insurers can use cost-sharing
to direct consumers to lower-cost methods within the category. The guidelines also
state speciﬁcally that insurers must exempt individuals from cost-sharing for methods
which their physicians deem medically necessary, even if it is a method normally
covered with cost-sharing (HHS, 2015).
4.2. Data: Claims database from OptumInsight
For this analysis, I use a 10% sample of the OptumInsight data from the ﬁrst quarter of
2008 through the second quarter of 2013. OOP costs and utilization of contraceptives
are estimated the same way they were for the state mandates analysis; see Section
3.2 for a detailed description of these methods.
Monthly OOP costs show signiﬁcant seasonal variation, so for some ﬁgures I adjust for
this variation by regressing pre-August 2012 OOP costs on a set of monthly dummies
(January, February, etc.), and then plot the residual variation in OOP costs. All
OOP costs are presented in inﬂation-adjusted 2013 dollars. I only do this for some
descriptive ﬁgures; in all regression analyses I simply include a full set of month-year
dummies (Jan-2008, Feb-2009, etc.) to adjust for seasonality.
As a descriptive exercise, I also estimate the share of total OOP costs spent on
contraceptives, and then perform a back-of-the-envelope calculation to estimate the
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mean and median implied savings-per-woman from the ACA mandate. To estimate
the share of OOP costs spent on prescription contraceptives, I focus on users of
OCPs and new IUD insertions, the two most commonly used reversible prescription
contraceptive methods in the U.S. To minimize selection bias, I limit this portion
of my analysis to women who were continuously enrolled in insurance from January
2012 to June 2013, and then compare spending patterns among OCP users and women
who received IUD insertions in the pre-period (January to June 2012) vs. the post-
period (January to June 2013). I deﬁne OCP users as women who were continually
enrolled between January 2012 and January 2013 and had at least one claim for an
OCP in both the pre- and post-periods, and I include spending in both periods for
OCP users. I deﬁne IUD users as women who had an IUD inserted in either the pre-
or post-period, and I include spending for IUD users only in the period in which the
woman received her IUD.
For each woman, I sum their OOP spending on either OCPs or their IUD insertion,
and divide that value by their total OOP spending during that period. Using these
percentages and the mean and median total OOP spending values for these users,
I then estimate the mean and median implied savings on OCPs and IUD insertions
per woman attributable to the ACA mandate. Implied savings are calculated by
multiplying the mean (median) total spending by the mean (median) percentage of
spending spent on that method for each period, then subtracting the 2013 estimate
from the 2012 estimate. This calculation therefore takes into account the possibility
that total average OOP spending might have changed during this time period. For
OCP users, this value is then multiplied by two to estimate total yearly spending.
Very rarely, women are mistakenly coded for both an IUD and implant insertion in
the same encounter, resulting in double-counting costs. I drop these values before
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averaging the shares. I also drop any negative OOP expenses reported in the data.
All costs are presented in inﬂation-adjusted 2013 dollars.
4.3. Descriptive statistics and ﬁgures
My analytic dataset is a 10% sample of individuals from the OI database, limited to
women in private health insurance between 2008m1 and 2013m3 between the ages of
13 and 45. The total sample size is 17,645,135 observations, with 790,894 individual
women. The mean and median lengths of enrollment in the data are 22.3 months and
17 months, respectively.
Figures 14, 15, and 16 present descriptive time series of the claim and usage rates for
all prescription birth control methods, short-term prescription birth control methods,
and LARC methods. Each ﬁgure has a vertical red line to represent August 2012,
when the mandate went into eﬀect. There are no striking changes in utilization,
either in short-term or long-term methods, in either the claim rates or the estimated
usage rates. Note the sharp rises in estimated usage rates for total and short-term
methods during the ﬁrst three months of 2008; these are an artifact of the the way
I've estimated usage, since many women on a three-month prescription schedule will
not show up as using a method until they reﬁll their prescriptions in month two or
three of their cycle. There are also yearly patterns where utilization dips in the ﬁrst
month of each year. This is also an artifact of my method of estimating use, since
the ﬁrst month of each year is when the greatest number of women enter and exit
the dataset. Women who exit are likely replaced by women who, having obtained a
new health insurance plan, take a month or two to renew their prescription. This dip
does not reﬂect a true drop in utilization since many women on short-term methods
are likely to have a month or two of their method in reserve.
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I also explore the intensive margin of contraceptive use; that is, the distribution of
methods chosen by contraceptive users. I present use ﬁrst by all methods (Figure
17) and then by all methods excluding OCPs and IUDs (Figure 18). There are some
interesting trends over time in the distribution of methods chosen. IUD use has grown
steadily since 2008 relative to all other methods, from about 10% of users to slightly
les than 20% of users. OCP use, meanwhile, has declined from about more than
80% to about 70%. Together, OCPs and IUDs consistently make up about 90% of
contraceptive use. Sterilization is the third most popular option, at about 8% of user
by the end of the study period. The vaginal ring is the fourth most popular option at
about 5-6% of users, followed by the tri-monthly injection at about 3%. Use of the
implant is rare but has risen from near zero to about 1.5% of users. Use of the patch
is rare and has declined slightly; use of diaphragms, cervical caps and emergency con-
traception is basically nonexistent relative to other methods. It's important to note
that most brands of emergency contraception are available over-the-counter during
this period, so my estimates of emergency contraceptive likely dramatically under-
estimate use. There are no obvious immediate shifts in the distribution of methods
chosen following the implementation of the ACA mandate.
I also present the mean monthly OOP costs for all short-term (Figure 19) and long-
term (Figure 20) methods. Several interesting trends are visible in these ﬁgures. The
ﬁrst is that all of the average monthly costs of the short-term methods are considerably
less than the long-term methods. The second is that there is a lot of seasonal variation
in the OOP cost. This variation is much more pronounced among methods that are
administered in physician oﬃces: IUDs, implants, and the injection. This is because
costs for these methods count towards health insurance deductibles, and as the year
progresses women are more likely to have spent up to their deductible or OOP limit
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and incur less cost-sharing for a given method. OOP costs for the short-term methods
tend to increase a small amount in the ﬁrst month of each year, which is possibly due
to increased copays taking eﬀect as plans renew.
The average costs for most methods fall sharply following August 2012. The only
two methods whose costs appear mostly unchanged are the ring and the patch. This
correlates with the anecdotal reports I'd heard from women's health providers and
the recent studies reporting variation in insurer compliance with the mandate (Akers,
2014; Sobel et al., 2015; Benyo et al., 2015). Now that the administration has clariﬁed
which categories of contraceptive methods are required to have an option included in
plans with no cost-sharing, I expect the OOP cost for the ring and patch will drop
moving forward as insurers come into full compliance with the mandate.
I also present seasonally adjusted OOP costs for OCPs and IUDs, the two most
commonly used methods (Figure 21). The average adjusted monthly OOP price of
OCPs fell from $33 to $19 between June of 2012 and June of 2013; the average
adjusted OOP price of IUDs fell from $267 to $120 in that same time period.
In order to assess the relative magnitude of these OOP cost changes for contraceptive
users, Table 18 reports total mean and median OOP spending and the percentage
of that spending spent on contraceptives for OCP users and women who receive
IUD insertions. Because the mandate was implemented mid-year in 2012, I compare
spending percentages in the ﬁrst six months of 2012 with the ﬁrst six months of 2013.
For women who were enrolled in insurance continuously and had at least one claim
for OCPs in both periods, the mean and median percentages of OOP spending spent
on OCPs drop from 44.0% and 36.0% to 22.4% and 0%, respectively. For women who
received an IUD during these same periods, the mean and median OOP spending
percentages in the period they received their IUD drop from 30.3% and 13.2% to
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11.3% and 0%, respectively.
I use these values to perform a back-of-the-envelope estimation of the per-woman
savings on yearly OCP costs for OCP users and IUD insertions for women receiving
IUDs. I estimate that the average OCP user is saving $254.91 per year, and the
median OCP user is saving $204.65 per year. Mean and median savings on IUD
insertions are estimated to be $248.30 and $107.95 per woman, respectively (Table
18).
4.4. Regression analyses
Unlike the state-level mandates, there is no geographic or temporal variation in the
implementation of the ACA mandate. I therefore identify the impact of the ACA
mandate by using variation in the magnitude of the change in the OOP price at the
group level. Some groups show bigger average changes in OOP cost for some methods
than others; if there is any response to the change in OOP price, there would be a
larger change in use in groups where the OOP price dropped by a larger amount.
In order to examine within-group changes, I take a 10% sample of groups (rather
than individuals). I limit my regression analyses to the period January 2012 to June
2013, as this is the period in which I quantify the within-group change in price. In
order to quantify the within-group change in price of a given contraceptive method,
it is also necessary to limit my analysis to groups in which the rate of claims of that
method was non-zero in both periods for which I quantify the price change.
I use the following regression speciﬁcation to test whether there are diﬀerential changes
in use by group:
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P (Yijmg = 1) = f(λ[1 = Post]m + θ4OOPjg + β[1 = Post]×4OOPjg +Ximg)
Here, i indexes individuals, j indexes the type of method, m indexes months, and g
indexes groups. The outcome of interest is the probability of any contraceptive use.
4OOPjg is the within-group change in the OOP price of method j between the ﬁrst
six months of 2012 and the ﬁrst six months of 2013. This variable can be thought
of as the dosage eﬀect of the mandate; some groups saw a drop in OOP price for
a given method, while others saw no change or increased OOP price following the
mandate.
I perform the analysis using both the mean and median changes in OOP price. The
coeﬃcient of interest is β, which tests the hypothesis that the change in use of contra-
ceptives after the mandate varies by the changes in OOP price for a method. Because
4OOPjs is negative, a negative estimate for β would suggest that use increased more
in states with a larger drop in price.
I perform this analysis for the two most commonly claimed methods in the data,
OCPs and IUDs. My analytic sample varies by method because use of OCPs and
IUDs varies by group. For each method, I limit my analysis to groups where the
rate of use of the method was non-zero for both of the periods where I calculate the
mean and median change in OOP price. For the OCP analysis, my ﬁnal sample is
3,279,542 observations, and 256,514 individual women enrolled in 4,051 groups. For
the IUD analysis, my ﬁnal sample is 2,250,458 observations, and 173,352 individual
women enrolled in 245 groups.
I also use this model to analyze choice of method on the intensive margin; that is,
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testing for substitution to OCPs and IUDs within contraceptive users. I use the same
model speciﬁcation as above, except my dependent variable is the probability of use
of OCPs or IUDs, conditional on using any prescriptive contraceptive.
As a sensitivity analysis, I also test a version of the above speciﬁcation that includes
a interrupted linear time trend interacted with the 4OOPjg variable:
P (Yijmg = 1) = f(Ximg + β1Timem + β2[1 = Post]m + β34OOPjg
β4[1 = Post]m ×4OOPjg + β5Timem ×4OOPjg + β6[Time since 2012m8]m
β7[Time since 2012m8]m ×4OOPjg
This could be considered a de-trended dose-response diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence analysis,
or alternatively, a dose-response interrupted time series analysis. It allows for both
a level and slope change in utilization following the ACA mandate, and allows that
level and slope change to vary by the dosage eﬀect of the mandate, 4OOPjg.
4.4.1. Regression results
Figure 22 present scatterplots of the state-level change from 2012 to 2013 in mean
OOP prices of OCPs (IUDs) by the change in state-level use of OCPs (IUDs). There
is large variation at the employer-group level in the magnitude of the change in
OOP price for both methods. These ﬁgures do suggest a relationship between the
magnitude of the change in OOP price and the change in utilization of that method;
although it is noisy, there does appear to be a slightly negative relationship between
the change in mean OOP price and the change in rate of use for both methods. Figures
plotting the change in median price by the change in rate of use were qualitatively
similar (results not shown).
To visualize the change in utilization by the dosage eﬀect of the ACA mandate,
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Figure 23 presents time series of claim rates of OCPs and IUDs. For both ﬁgures,
the solid blue line represents the average employer-group rate of utilization for groups
whose mean OOP price dropped in 2013 relative to 2012. The dotted red line rep-
resents the average claim rates for a given method among employer-groups whose
average OOP price stayed the same or decreased in this same period. For both ﬁg-
ures, claim rates are presented as averages, weighted by the number of enrollees in
that group in that month. Both ﬁgures suggest that employers that saw OOP price
decreases for OCPs or IUDs experienced increased claim rates for that method. The
ﬁgures also do not suggest big diﬀerences in pre-trends between the groups that were
more or less aﬀected by the ACA mandate.
Tables 19 and 20 present the results of regressions testing whether usage rates of
OCPs and IUDs vary by the magnitude of the average change in price by group. The
coeﬃcients of interest are the interaction between the change in OOP price and the
post-mandate dummy. For the analysis of OCP utilization, the coeﬃcients of interest
are negative and signiﬁcant, regardless of whether the identifying variation is the
change in mean or change in median OOP price. The coeﬃcient on Post x Change
in Mean OOP price is −0.000433. This can be interpreted as the expected change
in utilization when the mean OOP price for OCPs increases by $1. If we scale this
coeﬃcient by the overall drop in mean OOP price for OCPs over this period, $12.37,
we would expect the ACA mandate to result in an increase of 0.000433 × $12.37 =
0.0054 in the probability of using OCPs. The rate of use of OCPs overall is 0.1386,
so this price change has only a small impact on overall OCP use. We can use this
change to produce a back-of-the-envelope arc elasticity estimate. If we assume that
the OOP price dropped by 100%, this estimate comes out to be: −0.0054
0.1386
/1 = −0.039.
This is a very inelastic estimate for demand for OCPs, but it is consistent with the
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only other demand elasticity estimate from the U.S. market in the literature (−0.04
to −0.09) (Collins and Hershbein, 2013).
Similarly in the IUD analysis, the coeﬃcient on the Post x Mean IUD change model
is negative and signiﬁcant. However, when I use the change in the median instead of
the change in the mean, the estimate becomes non-signiﬁcant. If we use the coeﬃcient
on Post x Mean IUD change to estimate an arc elasticity for IUDs, we also get a
very inelastic estimate. The mean OOP price of IUDs during this period dropped
from $262.38 to $84.3, so if we scale the coeﬃcient by this price change, we get a
0.00000714 × $178.08 = 0.0013 change in the rate of IUD use. The baseline rate of
use of IUDs is 0.0342, and if we assume a 100% drop in OOP price, this produces an
elasticity estimate of −0.0013
0.0342
/1 = −0.038.
Tables 21 and 22 present the results of models that include the interrupted linear
trend. There are two coeﬃcients of interest to note here: the level x dosage interaction
Post x4OOPjg, and the slope x dosage interaction [Timesince2012m8]m×4OOPjg.
These are given for the mean and median OOP change for OCPs in Table 21, and for
IUDs in Table 22. I ﬁnd results for these models that are robust for the mean changes
in OOP price, but not the median change in OOP price. The coeﬃcient on the level
change is not statistically signiﬁcant for any model, but the coeﬃcient on the slope
change for the mean change in OOP price of OCPs is -0.0000322 and statistically
signiﬁcant at the 10% level (p = 0.052). The coeﬃcient for the slope change on the
mean change in OOP price of IUDs is -0.00000181 and statistically signiﬁcant at the
5% level.
It's also important to note that this analysis has some potential endogeneity bias that
may bias me towards the null. Women willing to pay a higher OOP price pre-mandate
are likely to diﬀer from women willing to pay a lower OOP price in a diﬀerent state
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or group. If the consumers in states with a larger change in the magnitude of the
OOP price for a method have more inelastic demand for the product, this would bias
me towards a null ﬁnding in this analysis.
Overall, the results from this analysis suggest that consumers are very unresponsive
to OOP price of OCPs and IUDs. Although the models demonstrate a statistically
signiﬁcant price response, the magnitude of the eﬀect size is small.
4.4.2. Robustness checks:
I've conducted several robustness checks for this analysis.
 In addition to examining the extensive margin of OCP and IUD use, I also
ran the above models only among contraceptive users to see if there were large
shifts in the type of method chosen by user. Results from these models were
non-signiﬁcant.
 Triple diﬀerences: I also tried using the above models and adding a triple dif-
ference by age and by non-white status. The triple-diﬀerence by age was non-
signiﬁcant. The triple-diﬀerence by race, using a dummy variable for non-white
race/ethnicity status, found a positive and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of
interest on the triple interaction term. Because 4OOPjg is negative, this sug-
gests that, compared with whites, non-whites increased their use of IUD less
post-mandate than did whites.
 I also tested this analysis at the more aggregated state level, using the state-level
change in the mean and median OOP price as my identifying variation. Results
from these state-level models found non-signiﬁcant impacts of the mandate on
contraceptive use.
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4.5. Sensitivity analysis: Enrollment in grandfathered plans
Another source of plausibly exogenous variation in mandate impact is whether or
not a women is enrolled in a grandfathered plan that is not yet subject to the man-
date. With perfect data, I would be able to see when an individual woman in my
data switched or renewed plans and therefore make inferences about when her plan
switched from grandfathered to non-grandfathered status. Unfortunately, the data
contains no information regarding when a woman may have switched or renewed
plans during an uninterrupted enrollment period, and very little information about
plan characteristics.
However, because the data contains state of residence, I can leverage geographic
variation in the percent of employees enrolled in grandfathered plans. From the
staﬀ of the Kaiser Employee Health Beneﬁts Survey, I obtained the grandfathered
plan enrollment percentages by census division from 2011 to 2013. Due to concerns
regarding potential identiﬁcation of employers, they were not able to release state-
level estimates to me. Table 17 shows the enrollment percentages for the nine census
regions over time.
I use the following baseline speciﬁcation to test whether there are larger changes in
utilization in divisions where fewer people were enrolled in grandfathered plans:
P (Yits = 1) = f(γm + θs + β[1 = PostACAmandate]× Enrolldt +Xits)
This analysis includes data from January 2011 to June 2013. Here, i indexes individ-
uals, s indexes states, and d indexes census divisions, while m indexes months and t
indexes years. Individual covariates included in Xits include age, race, and the me-
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dian education level of that individual's census tract. As before, of these individual
covariates, only age is time-varying; the other two are only available at one point in
time in the data. For some speciﬁcations of the model, I also add in division-speciﬁc
time trends (µd × t) or state-speciﬁc time trends (θs × t).
Enrolldt is the census division-level rate of enrollment in grandfathered health plans
in year t, and takes a value between 0 and 1. The coeﬃcient of interest is β, which
reﬂects any diﬀerential pattern of contraceptive use over time in areas where the
mandate applied to more people than in areas where it applied to fewer people.
Because an increase in Enrolldt means that the ACA aﬀected fewer people in that
area, a negative value for β would suggest that the mandate increased contraceptive
use.
My identifying assumption in this analysis is that in the absence of the ACA man-
date, trends in contraceptive usage in census divisions with higher grandfathered plan
enrollment would have been equivalent to trends in contraceptive use in divisions with
lower grandfathered plan enrollment. Given that trends in contraceptive use could po-
tentially vary by geography, I also conduct a test of my identifying assumption using
a dynamic model speciﬁcation that interacts the enrollment in each census division
in a given year with a series of month dummies, as follows:
P (Yits = 1) = f(γm + θs +
M∑
m=0
βm × γm × Enrolldt +Xims)
As before, i indexes individuals, s indexes states, and d indexes census divisions,
while m indexes months and t indexes years. Individual covariates included in Xits
include age, race, and the median education level of that individual's census tract. My
coeﬃcients of interest are now the βm values, which reﬂect any diﬀerential patterns
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of use in high vs. low enrollment census divisions in a given month.
Importantly, this model does not assume any change in slope or level of contraceptive
use for any particular month. A ﬁnding that βm values prior to the mandate are sta-
tistically equivalent to zero while βm values following the ACA mandate are negative
and statistically signiﬁcant would support both my identifying assumption and an
interpretation that the mandate had a positive impact on contraception use. In con-
trast, statistically signiﬁcant values for βm in the pre-mandate period, either positive
or negative, would suggest a violation of my identifying assumption and potential
bias of the coeﬃcient β from the baseline model speciﬁcation.
4.5.1. Regression results
Regression results from this analysis are presented in Table 23. The baseline model
with state and time ﬁxed eﬀects ﬁnds a negative and signiﬁcant association between
being in a division with lower grandfathered plan enrollment and the post-mandate
period. However, this ﬁnding is not robust to either division or state-speciﬁc linear
trends. For a negative association between grandfathered plan enrollment and pre-
scription birth control to be seen in the baseline diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence model but
disappear with the addition of division or state-speciﬁc linear trends suggests that
the parallel trends assumption of the model may be violated. I therefore turn to my
dynamic model speciﬁcation to examine whether there is a statistically signiﬁcant
association between census division grandfathered enrollment and contraceptive use
prior to the implementation of the mandate.
Figure 25 presents the results from the dynamic model speciﬁcation in as a ﬁgure,
with each month's βm coeﬃcient plotted on the y-axis and months on the x-axis.
The reference month is the month of mandate implementation, August 2012. The
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results suggest there is a clear pre-trend in the data that is unchanged after mandate
implementation; during this time period, census divisions with lower levels of grand-
fathered plan enrollment have contraceptive use rates that are increasing faster than
divisions with lower levels of grandfathered plan enrollment. This trend appears to
have been present before the ACA mandate and appears unchanged following man-
date implementation. My results in this analysis therefore support my ﬁnding that
there seems to be very little change in utilization in response to the ACA mandate.
4.6. Discussion
I ﬁnd evidence that OOP costs for birth control have dropped dramatically follow-
ing the implementation of the ACA mandate. However, descriptive time series and
regression analyses do not suggest any large shifts in utilization following these price
changes, either in overall utilization rates or the type of product chosen. Using
variation in the change in mean/median OOP price at the group level, I do ﬁnd sta-
tistically signiﬁcant impacts of the price change on utilization of OCPs and IUDs,
but the magnitude of the eﬀect is small even when statistically signiﬁcant. I estimate
an arc elasticity of demand of -0.039 for the pill and -0.038 for the IUD, both very
inelastic estimates.
There are two potential reasons for this ﬁnding. The ﬁrst is that for demand for
contraception among women in private health insurance is inelastic. The second is
that demand for contraceptives is more elastic than I estimate here, but adjusts slowly
to price shifts, and my data is too short-term to see these responses.
4.6.1. Limitations
As I've discussed in earlier sections of this chapter, my current analysis potentially
suﬀers from some selection that may bias me towards the null, because women in
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ﬁrms where the OOP price was higher prior to the ACA are have potentially more
inelastic demand than women in ﬁrms with lower OOP price before the mandate.
This limits my ability to deﬁnitively argue that the small demand responses seen in
my results are due to inelastic demand for contraceptives. In addition, I only have
eleven months of data following the implementation of the ACA mandate, and am
therefore only able to detect very short-term eﬀects of the mandate. When more data
become available, further research will have to determine more deﬁnitively whether
there are longer-run impacts on OOP spending and utilization.
4.6.2. Future work
It will be important to continue to examine the impacts of the ACA mandate in
future work. There are several analyses I could consider implementing using this
data. The ﬁrst is to consider a discrete choice survival analysis with my outcome
being time to ﬁrst use of a contraceptive. I could also consider diﬀerent samples of
women who might be more actively choosing their contraceptive method; teenagers
or post-partum mothers are two potential populations I could consider focusing on in
more depth.
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4.7. Tables and Figures
Table 17: Grandfathered plan enrollment by census division over time
Division 2011 2012 2013
New England 43.3% 32.1% 32.2%
Mid Atlantic 55.8% 39.7% 24.2%
East North Central 58.4% 37.5% 32.0%
West North Central 55.3% 49.3% 30.3%
South Atlantic 53.2% 56.4% 33.2%
East South Central 49.6% 57.3% 53.3%
West South Central 48.4% 53.1% 46.3%
Mountain 65.3% 42.8% 44.1%
Paciﬁc 63.9% 57.1% 38.3%
Figure 14: Prescription contraceptive use by month
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Figure 15: Short-term prescription contraceptive use by month
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Figure 16: LARC use by month
Figure 17: Conditional use by method
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Figure 18: Conditional use of less frequently used methods by month
Figure 19: Unadjusted mean monthly OOP cost of short-term methods
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Figure 20: Unadjusted mean monthly cost of LARC methods
Figure 21: Adjusted mean monthly costs for OCPs and IUDs
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Table 18: Percentage of total OOP spending spent on prescription birth control by
OCP users and women receiving IUDs
January to June, 2012 January to June, 2013
Panel A: OCP users Mean Median Mean Median
Total OOP spending $557.08 $284.10 $524.12 $244.19
% of OOP spending
spent on OCPs
44.00% 36.00% 22.40% 0.00%
Mean Median
Implied savings per
OCP user
$254.91 $204.65
January to June, 2012 January to June, 2013
Panel B: IUD
insertions
Mean Median Mean Median
Total OOP spending $1,181.52 $817.31 $975.34 $418.86
% of OOP spending
spent on IUD
insertion
30.30% 13.20% 11.30% 0.00%
Mean Median
Implied savings per
IUD insertion
$248.30 $107.95
Table 19: Eﬀect of ACA Mandate on OCP utilization: price change by group
(1) (2)
OCP use OCP use
Post -0.00161 -0.00106
(0.00266) (0.00298)
Mean OCP change -0.000914+
(0.000475)
Post x Mean OCP change -0.000433∗∗
(0.000155)
Median OCP change -0.000684
(0.000496)
Post x Median OCP change -0.000318∗
(0.000159)
Individual covariates Yes Yes
Observations 3111220 3111220
R2 0.013 0.013
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.001
All models weighted by group size. Individual covariates include age, race, and median census
tract education level.
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Figure 22: Change in mean OOP price vs change in usage rate by state, for OCPs
and IUDs
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Figure 23: Claim rates of OCPs and IUDs by the group-level impact of the ACA
mandate
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Table 20: Eﬀect of ACA Mandate on IUD utilization: price change by group
(1) (2)
IUD use IUD use
Post -0.000643∗ -0.000753+
(0.000290) (0.000402)
Mean IUD change 0.0000594∗
(0.0000289)
Post x Mean IUD change -0.00000714∗
(0.00000288)
Median IUD change -0.000000654
(0.0000249)
Post x Median IUD change -0.00000111
(0.00000256)
Individual covariates Yes Yes
Observations 2136471 2136471
R2 0.005 0.004
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.001
All models weighted by group size. Individual covariates include age, race, and median census
tract education level.
Figure 24: Division-level usage rates vs. % of people enrolled in grandfathered plans
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Table 21: Eﬀect of ACA Mandate on OCP utilization: Price change by group with
linear time trend
(1) (2)
OCP use OCP use
Time 0.000132 0.000166
(0.000218) (0.000237)
Post 0.000509∗ 0.000495∗
(0.000221) (0.000225)
Time since 2012m8 -0.000553∗ -0.000509∗∗
(0.000146) (0.000175)
Mean OCP change -0.000815+
(0.000437)
Time x Mean OCP change -0.0000246+
(0.0000134)
Post x Mean OCP change -0.0000196
(0.0000785)
Time since 2012m8 x Mean OCP change -0.0000322+
(0.0000166)
Median OCP change -0.000614
(0.000451)
Time x Median OCP change -0.0000173
(0.0000147)
Post x Median OCP change -0.0000474
(0.0000616)
Time since 2012m8 x Median OCP change -0.0000190
(0.0000145)
Individual covariates Yes Yes
Observations 3111220 3111220
R2 0.013 0.013
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.001
All models weighted by group size. Individual covariates include age, race, and median census
tract education level.
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Table 22: Eﬀect of ACA Mandate on IUD utilization: Price change by group with
linear time trend
(1) (2)
IUD use IUD use
Time 0.000384∗ 0.000391∗
(0.0000228) (0.0000259)
Post 0.00173+ 0.00163+
(0.000924) (0.000959)
Time since 2012m8 -0.000973∗ -0.000985∗
(0.000181) (0.000202)
Mean IUD change 0.0000582∗
(0.0000294)
Time x Mean IUD change 0.000000314
(0.000000354)
Post x Mean IUD change 0.000000903
(0.00000314)
Time since 2012m8 x Mean IUD change -0.00000181∗
(0.000000729)
Median IUD change -0.00000244
(0.0000256)
Time x Median IUD change 0.000000447
(0.000000303)
Post x Median IUD change -0.00000185
(0.00000152)
Time since 2012m8 x Median IUD change -0.000000548
(0.000000351)
Individual covariates Yes Yes
Observations 2136471 2136471
R2 0.005 0.004
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.001
All models weighted by group size. Individual covariates include age, race, and median census
tract education level.
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Table 23: Relative Eﬀect of ACA Mandate on census divisions with lower vs. higher grandfathered plan enrollment
(1) (2) (3)
Prescription BC Use Prescription BC Use Prescription BC Use
Post-mandate x GF plan enrollment -0.0134∗ -0.00442 -0.00429
(0.00594) (0.00530) (0.00530)
Individual covariates Yes Yes Yes
Month-Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Division-speciﬁc linear trends No Yes No
State-speciﬁc linear trends No No Yes
Observations 7331950 7331950 7331950
R2 0.013 0.013 0.013
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Individual covariates include age, race, and education.
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Figure 25: Coeﬃcient estimates of βm values from dynamic regression model
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CHAPTER 5 : Conclusion
This project is a comprehensive examination of the impact of contraception coverage
mandates on contraceptive utilization. In this chapter I brieﬂy summarize my results,
and then discuss some implications and future directions for the project. Table 24
presents a summary of the results, limitations, and future directions for each analysis.
5.1. The impact of state-level contraceptive coverage mandates
Using both survey and administrative claims data, I ﬁnd no evidence that the state-
level contraceptive coverage mandates impacted contraceptive utilization. However,
I do ﬁnd some evidence that the state mandates did result in more methods being
covered by employer groups. These impacts were explained mostly by increases in
coverage of the patch. This could potentially explain why I saw little eﬀect on the
choice of longer-term methods in my analysis; if coverage of longer-term methods
like the IUD was already included by most plans, I wouldn't expect to detect a shift
towards those methods following the mandates. Regardless, my results suggest that
women were unresponsive to the decreases in OOP cost for contraceptives following
the mandates.
My results in these analyses contradict the ﬁndings from other work examining these
state mandates. One study, Magnusson et al. (2012), was a purely cross-sectional
analysis and did not employ a causal identiﬁcation strategy. The other two studies,
Atkins and Bradford (2014) and Dills and Cotet-Grecu (2014), use data from one
survey, the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance Study, and only examine a subset
of mandates. Neither are able to limit their analysis only to women in plans with
employers who do not self-insure, an important limitation that I am able to address
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using my analysis of the OptumInsight dataset in Chapter 3.
Both of my analyses of the state mandates are subject to limitations. In my analysis
of the NSFG, my power to detect an eﬀect may be limited by my sample size. In my
analysis using the OptumInsight data, the imperfect nature of the group identiﬁer
variable and the small size of most groups makes it diﬃcult to impute group-level
coverage of diﬀerent contraceptive methods.
5.2. The impact of the ACA mandate
I ﬁnd strong evidence that the ACA mandate has decreased OOP expenditures on
prescription contraceptives. I see large decreases in mean and median OOP price
for most contraceptive methods, with the median price of most methods falling to
zero within several months of mandate implementation. In my primary analysis, I
test for diﬀerential responses in utilization in employer groups with smaller or larger
average changes in OOP price. I ﬁnd that women in employer groups with larger
drops in average OOP price of the pill or the IUD increase their utilization of these
contraceptive methods, but the magnitude of the increases are small. Back-of-the-
envelope arc elasticity of demand estimate for the pill and the IUD (-0.039 and -
0.038, respectively) suggest that women in private health insurance are fairly price-
insensitive in their demand for these products.
There are some limitations to this analysis. The short-term nature of my dataset
makes it impossible for me to rule out longer-term impacts of the ACA mandate. In
addition, there may be some selection bias in my identiﬁcation strategy that could bias
me towards ﬁnding no eﬀect of the mandate. However, the results of my robustness
checks using diﬀerent identiﬁcation strategy also support my ﬁndings that there are
no large changes in utilization in response to the ACA mandate.
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5.3. Policy implications, unanswered questions, and future research
My results suggest that women in private health insurance have inelastic demand for
contraceptives. In this project, I modeled demand for contraceptives using neoclassi-
cal economic theory. However, my results suggest that there may be more important
factors in women's choice of contraceptives than their OOP cost. One avenue for
future research would be to reframe demand for contraceptives in the context of be-
havioral economic theory. Two tenets of prospect theory are 1) people are risk-averse
over gains and risk-seeking over losses, and 2) people tend to overweight low proba-
bility events and underweight high-probability events (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979;
Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). I could consider this model in the context of pur-
chasing prescription contraceptives; we would expect women to be risk averse when
facing a low probability of a large loss such as an unplanned pregnancy. Addition-
ally, because people overweight losses relative to gains, it's possible that the demand
response to a copay decrease (a relative gain) may be smaller than the response to
a copay increase (a relative loss). The combination of these factors could help to
explain why I ﬁnd that demand for contraceptives is so unresponsive to price. In this
way, my results may be similar to studies of value-based insurance design programs
that study the impact of co-pay decreases for high-value services on utilization. While
some studies have found impacts on use, the eﬀect sizes have generally been small or
moderate, rather than large (Chernew et al., 2008; Choudhry et al., 2010a).
Another possible explanation for the lack of demand response is either varying de-
mand or selection on contraceptive coverage at the employer level. If some employers
primarily employ men, older women, or women uninterested in contraception for other
reasons, these employers would have lower demand for contraception. Similarly, it's
also possible that some women may choose their employer based on generosity of
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insurance coverage, although this second possibility seems less likely to me than the
ﬁrst. But both scenarios could explain both why insurance coverage of contraceptives
was low relative to other drug coverage in the early 2000s and why I see very little,
if any, demand responses to drops in the OOP price of contraceptives.
I see large OOP price decreases following the ACA mandate, but there are no large
changes in utilization in response. Further research will investigate whether this
apparent price unresponsiveness persists in the long-term. But in the absence of a
change in utilization, the ﬁnancial impact of the ACA mandate on wages is potentially
similar to that of the mandated coverage of maternity beneﬁts. If the wages of
women of child-bearing age can be adjusted separately to account for the increased
cost of insurance, then the incidence of the mandate will fall on them, much as the
incidence of mandated maternity beneﬁts has been found to be transferred almost
completely to women's wages (Gruber, 1994a). If, on the other hand, wages of women
cannot adjust separately from other employees, and instead wages decrease slightly for
everyone, then the ACA mandate is a ﬁnancial transfer to women of childbearing age
from other employees. Opponents of the ACA mandate have argued that including
contraceptives may increase the cost of insurance, while proponents have argued that
insurance coverage of contraceptives would pay for itself in lowered medical costs for
childbirth. My early results suggest that opponents of the ACA mandate are more
likely to be correct. However, it's also not clear that any resulting rise in insurance
premiums from the ACA mandate will be large enough to be economically signiﬁcant.
There may also be non-OOP price-related barriers to accessing contraceptives. A re-
cent prospective cohort study oﬀered participants their choice of contraceptive at no
cost, after counselling and education about all available methods. They found that
with the triple barriers of cost, knowledge and access removed, 75% of participants
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chose a LARC method (McNicholas et al., 2014). However, there are important dif-
ferences between this study and the likely impact of the ACA mandate. This study
only enrolled women who were interested in starting a new method, and speciﬁcally
counseled participants about the relative eﬀectiveness of LARC methods vs. more
short-term methods. In contrast, the ACA mandate lowers the OOP price of contra-
ceptives for all women in private health plans, many of whom might be uninterested in
changing their current contraceptive method. Furthermore, the ACA mandate does
not directly change provider behavior or impact consumer knowledge about contracep-
tives, although some providers may take it upon themselves to educate their patients
about the mandate. In some cases, women may not even be aware that their coverage
has changed. A recent study of young adults' experiences shopping for health insur-
ance on HealthCare.gov found that many were unaware that coverage for well-women
visits and contraception were included as a preventive service with no cost-sharing
(Wong et al., 2014).
My results highlight the challenges in implementing value-based insurance design.
While a much-touted strategy for reducing health care costs, actual consumer re-
sponses to copayment or coinsurance decreases are likely to vary substantially. Re-
cent research has found that for cardiac drugs, even dramatic decreases in copayments
resulted in only modest changes in utilization (Choudhry et al., 2010a). When contra-
ceptives were included in the ACA mandate, many women's health providers lauded
their inclusion, arguing that the law would result in fewer unwanted pregnancies and
abortions and reductions in health care costs. My research suggests that mandating
coverage of contraceptives alone is unlikely to achieve these goals in the absence of
further research into the factors aﬀecting demand for contraceptives.
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Table 24: Summary of results
State mandates State mandates ACA mandate
Dataset NSFG survey OptumInsight claims OptumInsight claims
Results No statistically
signiﬁcant change in
utilization
No statistically
signiﬁcant change in
utilization or OOP
costs; some evidence
that mandates
increased insurance
coverage at the
employer group level
Large drops in OOP
price following
mandate; little
evidence of large
changes in utilization.
I estimate very
inelastic demand
elasticities for the pill
(−0.039) and the IUD
(−0.038).
Limitations 1) Cannot limit to
women in
non-self-insured plans
2) Potential power
limitations
1) Data from only one
insurer
2) Cannot impute
plan-level insurance
coverage
1) Short
post-mandate period
Future directions Return to RDC to
complete power
analysis
Search for better
historical data on
insurance coverage of
contraceptives
Consider discrete
choice analysis or
analysis of subgroups
more likely to be
price-responsive; seek
longer-term data as it
becomes available
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